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ABSTRACT
In this article, game theory is applied to the battle of the forms and related 
scenarios to explain Daniel Keating’s observations, reported in the article 
“Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action,” 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000).  
The first of the two major findings in this article is that there is a game-theoretic 
reason drafters of boilerplate language should use adversarial, U.C.C. § 2-207(1) 
proviso-conforming language, namely, to ensure that clients receive terms that are 
no worse than the default U.C.C. gap fillers.  The second major finding is that 
there is a penalty default rule in contract law.  This has been debated by academics 
including Ian Ayres, Robert Gertner, and Eric Posner.  Under the U.C.C., 
consequential damages are part of the gap fillers, and thus part of the Nash 
Equilibrium default in the Battle of the Forms.  This default gap filler is applied 
even though a majority of parties do not include this term in their negotiated, 
functionally complete contracts.   
INTRODUCTION
A perception among some scholars is that Uniform Commercial Code 
(“U.C.C”) § 2-207 adds mud to the already murky battle of the forms.1  Professor 
Daniel Keating undertook original research exploring the real world application of 
the battle of the forms under the U.C.C. by conducting interviews with the agents 
and attorneys of various companies.2  Professor Keating’s excellent article, which 
resulted from these interviews, led to more questions than answers.3  Nevertheless, 
it provides observations that suggest Section 2-207 is preferable to alternative 
approaches to the battle of the forms.4  In this article, I will show that Section 2-
207 is perfectly workable and assert that it should remain largely unaltered.  To do 
1 U.C.C. § 2-207 (2004).  The “battle of the forms” refers to the situation arising when parties 
exchange forms with non-matching terms.  Some academics believe drafters are “left without a clear 
resolution in the case of a true battle of forms.  The UCC is a disaster when it comes to dealing with the 
battle of the forms.”  ROBERT A. FELDMAN & RAYMOND T. NIMMER, DRAFTING EFFECTIVE 
CONTRACTS §4.07[E] at 4-50 (2d ed. Supp. 2008). 
2 Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2678, 2693 
(2000). 
3 Id. at 2714-15 (acknowledging that the information is presented without an overarching theory: 
“[h]aving spent many hours on the phone in interviews that enabled me to see only the tip of a very 
large iceberg, I am left not with radical suggestions for change but instead with a few modest 
observations.”).   
4 Keating’s interviews show that practitioners would agree that only minimal changes to Section 2-
207, if any, would be desirable.  Id. at 2715. 
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this, I will apply game theory5 to create a model to explain how the U.C.C. affects 
the strategies drafters should use to navigate the battle of the forms and related 
scenarios.6
The model supports two findings.  The first is that adversarial boilerplate 
language should not be seen as unnecessarily creating ambiguity in the battle of the 
forms situation.7  This is important because courts have misinterpreted this 
strategic language as an underhanded attempt by parties to secure one-sided terms 
without taking on the costs of negotiation ex ante.  Instead, adversarial boilerplate 
language should be understood as allowing participants in the battle of the forms to 
reach a sustainable default position, the U.C.C. gap fillers.  When participating in 
the battle of the forms, clients with forms containing strategic language will be 
better off than their counterparts who do not have such forms.  
The second finding is that there is a penalty default rule in American contract 
5 Game theory is subject to imprecise assumptions: 
[G]ame theory highlights the problems of cooperation and explores specific 
strategies that alter the payoffs [of] players.  But there is a vast gap between the 
relatively clean, precise, and simple world of game theory and the complex, 
imprecise, and fumbling way by which human beings have gone about 
structuring human interaction.  Moreover, game theoretic models, like 
neoclassical models, assume wealth-maximizing players.  But as some of the 
experimental economics literature demonstrates, human behavior is clearly more 
complicated than can be encompassed in such a simple behavioral assumption.   
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open-Source Software, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 241, 304 
n.196 (2001) (quoting DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 15 (1991)). 
6 For an application of game theory to offer and acceptance, see Avery Katz, The Strategic 
Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 215 (1990).  Undertaking the present article, I heed Katz’s urge to promote “a particular research 
program; namely, the use of game theory to analyze the law of contract formation.”  Id. at 216.  See
also DOUGLAS BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).  Professor Baird wrote a comment 
on Keating’s battle-of-the-forms article.  Baird discussed the portion of Keating’s article regarding the 
Baird-Weisberg Model (a suggestion for changing Section 2-207).  Baird’s article explains, among 
other things, why boilerplate language is not meant to be sneaky, an important point, but one that is 
distinct from the ideas presented in this paper.  Consider Baird’s statement: “A vision of commercial 
law that worries excessively about the ability of parties to sneak terms past each other distracts us from 
the things that matter.”  Douglas G. Baird, Commercial Norms and the Fine Art of the Small Con, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2716, 2717 (2000).  Baird asserts that parties would put less one-sided language in their 
boilerplate language under the Baird-Weisberg Model because reputation would be on the line, not 
because sneakiness would be more difficult (given incentives to read the boilerplate language). Id. at 
2718.  Baird was probably responding to Keating’s statement: “[i]f a party persists in writing one-sided 
terms on its form, it will risk losing business since the other side is more likely to read a form that it 
knows it might be bound by.”  Keating, supra note 2, at 2706.  This statement could be understood to 
mean that one could not “get away with” one-sided boilerplate language if only it were read.  For further 
information regarding the importance of reputation in this context see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. 
Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827 (2006).  
See also infra Part IV Section 1, and Part VI Section 2, on the take-it-or-leave-it game and reputation 
curve.  For more information on the importance of virtues in capitalism see, JOHN MUELLER,
CAPITALISM DEMOCRACY & RALPH’S PRETTY GOOD GROCERY 21-56 (1999).  “As the Better Business 
Bureau puts it, ‘Honesty is the best policy.  It’s also the most profitable.’”  Id. at 23. 
7 For a discussion of the courts’ understanding of the use of this language, see infra Part VI Section 
1, The Courts’ Misunderstanding of Strategic Language.  Sometimes phrases that are inserted into a 
form to conform to a rule are referred to as magic language.  I prefer to call it adversarial or strategic 
because the outcome of inserting this language is predictable and expected once the strategy of its use is 
exposed.  This is about forethought, not sleight of hand. 
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law.8  Consequential damages in the U.C.C.,9 functioning as part of the gap fillers, 
are a default under the battle of the forms.  This particular gap filler acts as a 
penalty default, causing parties to participate in some negotiations ex ante to get 
around them, rather than save costs and rest on gap fillers wholesale as one might 
otherwise expect.10  Any changes to the U.C.C. should streamline the process of 
getting to the gap fillers, not displace them.  Displacing them would be 
counterproductive for the operation of the consequential-damages gap filler, and its 
effect as a penalty default rule,11 which encourages sellers to negotiate 
consequential damages ex ante.  
Part I of this Article provides some basic background legal information.  Part 
II discusses Professor Keating’s article and its findings.  Part III lays out the 
assumptions underlying the model, and Part IV gives a basic overview of game 
theory.  The model is presented in Part V.  Part VI examines the results of applying 
the model, including a critique of the courts’ policy explanations for applying 
Section 2-207(3), a description of the role accommodating terms have in a take-it-
or-leave-it form, and an argument for the presence of a penalty default rule in 
contract law.  I conclude the paper with suggestions for future empirical research 
and further development of this game-theoretic approach to contract negotiations. 
I. BACKGROUND
1. Contract Formation: Completeness, Boilerplate Language, and the 
Battle of the Forms 
A contract is never “complete,”12 because no contract can describe the 
obligations of parties for every potential state of the world.13  Where a more 
complete contract accounts for many future contingencies, a less complete contract 
might simply state the price and date of performance.14  Nevertheless, 
completeness does matter; courts seem to be more willing to aggressively interpret 
8 A penalty default rule is a rule that courts apply ex post as a default, but unlike other default 
rules, it is not set at what the majority of parties would have negotiated.  Thus it is a penalty, the 
existence of which encourages negotiation ex ante.  The existence of a penalty default rule in practice 
has been debated. 
9 See U.C.C. § 2-715 (2004). 
10 The model presented in this article should alleviate the concern of some scholars, such as 
Professor Craswell, that Keating did not address whether it should be easier for sellers to displace the 
U.C.C.’s standard default rules.  Richard Craswell, The Sound of One Form Battling, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2727, 2728 (2000).  Craswell’s article mostly pertains to partially negotiated and take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. 
11 A penalty default rule is one that is followed by courts when parties do not negotiate a term and 
the default is purposefully set against the wants of the parties to encourage them to reveal information, 
i.e. negotiate that term.  
12 Complete in the “real world” sense, rather than the legal sense (as when a court denies 
introduction of evidence for new terms under the parol evidence rule because it assumes certain 
contracts are legally complete).  
13 Karen Eggleston et al., The Design and Interpretation of Contracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 
NW. U. L. REV. 91 (2000). 
14 Id. at 91. 
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incomplete contracts than complete contracts.15  Although it may be desirable to 
create a complete contract,16 parties must consider the cost of negotiating and 
drafting such a contract.17  Many find it prudent to forgo negotiating some (or 
many) potentially pertinent terms of a contract.  Those who deem it more efficient 
to be incomplete only negotiate the “big” terms (e.g., date, price, quantity) and 
leave the rest to be settled later,18 if at all.19  Unless a contract is of substantial or 
unique worth to parties, they may not find it worthwhile to negotiate many of the 
smaller, non-immediate terms.20
Potential non-immediate terms are often supplied by “small print” or 
boilerplate language, typically located on the back of forms.  Boilerplates often 
contain language regarding warranty and liability.  Since boilerplate language is 
not negotiated, it must be drafted with forethought.  A lawyer must make 
assumptions about the future use of the forms when drafting boilerplate language 
to maximize the probable outcome of such use for a client.  To do this, the lawyer 
will need to consider the worst-case scenario.  If the client uses the form, without 
regard to what the form says and merely sends it off, the lawyer must consider 
what language would best serve this “automaton” client.  Recognizing that the 
boilerplate language will, by definition, be used in contracts that are not fully 
negotiated,21 one can discover the assumptions a drafter must make and see how 
this informs the language that is used.  In other words, one can see what strategy a 
drafter must employ to ensure clients are as well off as possible.22  First, however, 
it is necessary to understand the context in which issues regarding boilerplate 
language arise and are settled. 
In the cases where parties do not negotiate every term of their agreement, 
they may end up sending one another forms, after which point, they believe there is 
a contract.  When the boilerplate language of the exchanged forms conflict and a 
problem arises, the contents of the forms may need reconciliation.  If litigated, 
courts must decide which form will be controlling for each aspect of the agreement 
and interpret the results of this decision.  This question has come to be known as 
15 Id. at 92. 
16 Or at least one that is “functionally complete.”  See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner, & Richard 
Zeckhauser, Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts 10 (U. Chi. Law Sch. John M. Olin Law & Econ, 
Working Paper No. 93, 2000). 
17 Eggleston et al., supra note 13, at 92. 
18 For a discussion on shifting the costs of contracting ex post see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 127-28
(1989) (“When parties fail to contract because they want to shift the ex ante transaction cost to a 
subsidized ex post court determination, a penalty default of non-enforcement may be appropriate.”). 
19 The relatively smaller terms may also be called the non-immediate terms. 
20 Keating, supra note 2, at 2699-700.  The word “term” is defined in U.C.C. § 1-201: “‘[t]erm’ 
means a portion of an agreement that relates to a particular matter.”  Because boilerplate contents do not 
line up cleanly with this definition, I will say that the language used in boilerplates are potential terms.  
Nevertheless, I ask for the reader to forgive me if I slip into the less accurate, colloquial use of the 
word, term.  
21 Logically, if a contract were fully negotiated, no prefabricated language would be used. 
22 For an argument that boilerplates can be strategic see Robert B. Ahdieh, The Strategy of 
Boilerplate, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1036-37 (2006) (providing arguments that use of boilerplates can 
have signaling and coordination functions).  
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the battle of the forms.23  Over time, the battle has been resolved in different ways, 
but not without criticism.24
2. Transition to the U.C.C. 
Under the common law, the “mirror image” rule25 and the “last-shot” 
doctrine applied.26  The Uniform Commercial Code’s Section 2-207,27 however, 
has done away with these approaches.28  Black’s Law Dictionary explains that: “In 
its original version, U.C.C. § 2-207 attempted to resolve battles of the forms by 
abandoning the common law requirement of mirror-image acceptance and 
providing that a definite expression of acceptance may create a contract for the sale 
of goods even though it contains different or additional terms.”29  The section 
23 Keating, supra note 2, at 2681 n.7 (“When I refer to ‘the battle-of-the-forms situation’ or 
engaging in the battle of forms, I don’t mean to imply the existence of a dispute, but merely that forms 
were exchanged that had non-matching terms.”).  Black’s Dictionary defines the battle of the forms as 
follows: “[t]he conflict between the terms of standard forms exchanged between a buyer and a seller 
during contract negotiations.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004). 
24 “ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004) (“The rules of offer and acceptance are difficult 
to apply in certain circumstances known as the ‘battle of the forms’ where parties want to ensure that 
the contract is on terms of their choosing.”)  Id.  (quoting P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW 
OF CONTRACT 54 (3d ed. 1981));  see also Keating, supra note 2, at 2684 (“[One] source of complaint 
about the common law approach was the arbitrariness of the all-or-nothing nature of the last-shot 
doctrine.”).
25 Mirror-image rule:  
[In contracts it is the] doctrine that the acceptance of a contractual offer must be 
positive, unconditional, unequivocal, and unambiguous, and must not change, 
add to, or qualify the terms of the offer; the common-law principle that for a 
contract to be formed, the terms of an acceptance must correspond exactly with 
those of the offer.   
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (8th ed. 2004).   
Prior to the enactment of the U.C.C., the common law followed what became known as the ‘mirror 
image’ and ‘last shot’ doctrines, the former governing formation and the latter dictating terms.  What 
the mirror-image rule says is that when an offer is made, a purported acceptance whose terms are not 
the ‘mirror image’ of the offer will not count as an acceptance, but instead will be treated as a 
counteroffer.  Keating, supra note 2, at 2683. 
26 Last-shot doctrine:  
This is where the ‘last shot doctrine’ comes into play.  Because a purported 
acceptance such as [a] seller’s is treated as a counteroffer that is then accepted by 
the buyer’s performance, the seller’s terms will govern by virtue of its having 
fired the ‘last shot.’  Thus, under the common law approach, the contract would 
be formed upon the buyer’s payment, and the seller would get the benefit of its 
presumably more limited warranties and remedies when the machine 
malfunctioned in the buyer’s hands.   
Keating, supra note 2, at 2684.  Some authors have argued that instead of Section 2-207, a “best-
shot,” or “reasonable-shot” rule should be followed.  See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, An Ex-Ante View of 
the Battle of the Forms: Inducing Parties to Draft Reasonable Terms, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 350 
(2005). 
27 See infra p. 36-45, U.C.C. Appendix A § 2-207. 
28 Keating, supra note 2, at 2684-85. (“[S]ubsection (1) of section 2-207 marked the end to the 
common law’s mirror-image rule.”).  Keating, supra note 2, at 2684.  Black’s Dictionary  adds a notice 
that: “[i]n modern commercial contexts, the mirror-image rule has been replaced by a U.C.C. provision 
that allows parties to enforce their agreement despite minor discrepancies between the offer and the 
acceptance.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (8th ed. 2004). 
29 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (8th ed. 2004). 
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reads:
U.C.C. § 2-207.  Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation. 
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which 
is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states 
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless 
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different 
terms. 
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract.  
Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
they materially alter it; or 
notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a 
reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
(3)Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient 
to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise 
establish a contract.  In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of 
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any 
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act. 
For the purposes of this article, Subsection 3 is the most pertinent.30  Section 
2-207(3) comes into play when the writings of parties do not establish a contract, 
but both parties still act as if there were a contract.31  Under Subsection 3, the 
terms that are in agreement between the forms make part of the contract, but the 
conflicting terms are knocked out (the “knock-out rule”).  The knocked-out terms 
are supplied with “gap fillers” from elsewhere in the U.C.C., such as § 2-715.  
Notably, the gap fillers provide for consequential damages for the buyer and a 
good warranty.32  The former is significantly different from the latter in that it is 
not typically found in a functionally complete, negotiated contract.33
30 See Keating, supra note 2.  It is expected that buyers would include language in their forms that 
conforms to Section 2-207(2)(a) and (c).  I believe the jurisdictional differences in application of 
Section 2-207(2) could be used to further study this topic, including the prevalence of Section 2-207(1) 
proviso conforming language as a strategy for getting to the gap fillers.    
31 This scenario is not that uncommon.  See infra Part I, Section 3. 
32 Id. See Jom, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 151 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1998), UCC § 2-715 (Buyer’s 
Incidental and Consequential Damages); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW
126-27 (2007) (discussing consequential damages).  “In a battle of forms context, a buyer whose form 
fails to signify that certain terms by the seller would be objectionable may not be able to rely on gap 
fillers to [automatically take effect]” if the buyer omits language on a given point.  See FELDMAN, supra
note 1, § 4.04[C][1], 4-20 n.32.2 (2d ed. 2006 Supp.); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 126-27 (2007) (discussing consequential damages); § 4.04[C][1], 4-20 n.32.2 
(2d ed. 2006 Supp.); Jom, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 151 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1998). 
33 Keating, supra note 2, at 2689-90; see also infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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3. Case Law: Section 2-207(3) 
Consider a common business scenario.  In a business-to-business deal, Buyer 
sends a standard form purchase order to Seller for widgets.  Seller prints out its 
standard acknowledgement form and sends it to Buyer.34  Without reading over the 
forms, or understanding the implications of the legalese contained thereon,35 the 
widgets are then shipped and paid for.   
There is no problem here, even under the common law mirror-image rule, so 
long as the purchase order and acknowledgement form match term-for-term.  But, 
if they do not match,36 and a dispute arises, courts must determine which terms, if 
any, are controlling.  Following the U.C.C., courts apply Section 2-207.  The 
following cases, decided in federal court, illustrate the evolution of the application 
of Section 2-207(3), including how it is reached and what the result of reaching it 
will be. 
In 1977, the Seventh Circuit, in C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan 
International Co.,37 laid out the analysis courts have subsequently performed 
under Section 2-207.  A buyer, C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. (“Itoh”), submitted a 
purchase order for steel coils to a seller, Jordan International Company (“Jordan”), 
and Jordan responded by sending its acknowledgment form to Itoh.38  Jordan’s 
acknowledgment form contained the following statement: “Seller’s acceptance 
is . . . expressly conditional on Buyer’s assent to the additional or different terms 
and conditions set forth below and printed on the reverse side.  If these terms and 
conditions are not acceptable, Buyer should notify Seller at once.”39  The pertinent 
additional-or-different term in the acknowledgment form was an arbitration 
provision that was printed on the reverse side of Jordan’s acknowledgment, which 
Itoh never expressly assented to nor objected to until the dispute arose.40  Despite 
this difference in form terms, “both parties proceeded to performance[;] Jordan by 
delivering and Itoh by paying for the steel coils.”41  When a dispute arose, Jordan 
wanted to take it to arbitration – Itoh did not. 
The court determined that Jordan’s acknowledgment-form language came 
within the Section 2-207(1) proviso, because “acceptance [was] expressly made 
conditional on assent to the additional . . . terms.”42  The court explained that, as a 
result, no contract had been formed under Section 2-207(1): “Hence, the exchange 
of forms between Jordan and Itoh did not result in the formation of a contract 
under Section 2-207(1).”43
34 Of course it could be the buyer’s form that does not comport or conform.  
35 In other words, these are automaton clients.  See supra p.4. 
36 Which, given the business choice to send boilerplate forms instead of negotiating every single 
term, could easily happen in a smaller sale.  See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. 
37 C. Itoh & Co. (Am.) Inc. v. Jordan Int’l Co., 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977). 
38 Id. at 1230. 
39 Id. at 1232. 
40 Id. at 1230. 
41 Id. at 1236. 
42 C. Itoh & Co., 552 F.2d 1235.  
43 Id. at 1236. 
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The court stated that if a contract had been formed under Section 2-207(1), 
the question of whether a particular additional term would be included in the 
contract between the parties would have been answered under Section 2-207(2).44
But the court found no contract formed under Section 2-207(1), so Section 2-
207(2) was inapplicable.  The court turned to whether a contract was formed under 
Section 2-207(3) through conduct of both parties that recognized the existence of a 
contract.45  The court determined that Section 2-207(3) did operate to create a 
contract through the subsequent performance by both parties (i.e., both parties 
recognized the existence of a contract through their actions).46   
The court explained that as Section 2-207(3) operates to create a contract, it 
also defines which terms will constitute the contract so formed.47  Section 2-207(3) 
defines “the terms of the particular contract [as] those terms on which the writings 
of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any 
other provisions of this Act.”  Applying Section 2-207(3) the court saw that it was 
clear the Jordan and Itoh forms did not “agree” on arbitration,48 and moved on to 
ask if the Code provided an arbitration supplementary term, and determined it did 
not.49   
In a similar scenario arising in 1986, the Ninth Circuit, in Diamond Fruit 
Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp.,50 explained that under Subsection (3), “the disputed 
additional items on which the parties do not agree simply ‘drop out’ and are 
trimmed from the contract.”51  For a contract to be formed under 2-207(1) with 
conflicting forms, the assent to the counteroffer must be “specific and 
unequivocal.”52   
44 Id. at 1236 n.7.  Even under Section 2-207(2) it is possible that, in some jurisdictions, the 
knockout rule would be applied as to different terms.  See, e.g., Diatom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 
F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that a contract was formed by the swapping of forms 
under Section 2-207(1), but that the conflicting terms in the forms regarding a period of limitations and 
warranties were cancelled out and that the missing terms were to be supplied by the U.C.C.’s gap filler 
provisions, thereby precluding summary judgment). Still, drafters would probably prefer to skip Section 
2-207(2) by simply inserting the explicit conditional acceptance language so as not to leave the outcome 
to chance.  Astute drafters know that forms bearing proviso-conforming language ensure clients will get 
the least-worst possible outcome, i.e. the U.C.C. gap-fillers.  See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying 
text.
45 C. Itoh & Co., 552 F.2d 1228 at 1236.  Section 2-207(3) reads: “[c]onduct by both parties which 
recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings 
of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.  In such case the terms of the particular contract 
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms 
incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.” (emphasis added). 
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1237.  The court goes on to explain why it is “convinced that this conclusion does not 
result in any unfair prejudice,” Id., but a discussion of court explanations is reserved for another section 
below.  See infra Part VI Section 1. 
50 Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986).  Summers and 
White are conflicted about this case: Summers believes that the approach of this case does not allow an 
“anti-last shot policy” to be applied under 2-207(1), while White believes “that the seller could have 
declined to ship in the face of buyer’s silence.”  JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-3, at 40 (5th ed. 2000). 
51 Textile Unlimited, Inc. v. A. BMH & Co., 240 F.3d 781, 788 (9th Cir. 2001). 
52 Diamond, 794 F.2d at 1445. 
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Nevertheless, in 1992, the Seventh Circuit, in Dresser Industries, Inc., 
Waukesha Engine Division v. Gradall Co.,53 decided that “the district court acted 
appropriately in allowing the jury to consider the parties’ course of performance, 
course of dealing, and usage in the trade in deciding whether Dresser’s warranty 
became part of the contract under § 2-207(3)” thereby expanding the interpretation 
to the meaning of “supplementary terms” given in C. Itoh.54   
Although the courts have properly followed Section 2-207 for resolving the 
battle-of-the-forms under the U.C.C., their explanation for the policy behind the 
section has been, understandably,55 off.56  The courts have not fully grasped what 
parties are doing when they deal via form contracts.  Judges erroneously believe 
that parties are being sloppy (at best) or nefarious when they are merely acting in 
an economically rational manner—and in a way that is actually dictated by Section 
2-207’s legal framework.  The seed of the courts’ confusion may lie within the 
academic debates, as evidenced by their sharing similar assumptions to those that 
Keating challenged, which will be discussed in Part II, below.  The court’s 
assumptions will be revisited in Part VI.  
II. KEATING’S PAPER
Many articles have been written on Section 2-207.  Professor Keating boiled 
down the concerns academics have with 2-207 into three issues: (1) the current 
Section 2-207 is too technical, arbitrary, and uncertain in its outcomes; (2) the 
default terms to which Section 2-207 directs the parties are too favorable to the 
buyer and may not be terms that either side would have chosen in an arms-length 
bargain; and (3) the Current Section 2-207 encourages parties to draft completely 
one-sided forms.57  My model will show that the first issue is wrong, Section 2-
207 is less arbitrary and uncertain in its outcomes than many of its critics would 
admit; the second issue misses the purpose, there is a place for penalty default 
rules in the contract law; and finally that the third issue is not a bad thing, but a 
reasonable strategy in the battle of the forms.  This third issue will be directly 
addressed in the next section. 
To test whether common academic assumptions about the section were held 
in common with those who worked with the issue in practice, Professor Keating 
conducted telephone interviews to gather information on the battle of the forms 
53 Dresser Indus., Inc., Waukesha Engine Div. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442 (7th Cir. 1992). 
54 Id. at 1452.  “Bear in mind that the agreement of the parties is used to mean not only express 
language, but also trade usage, course of dealing, and course of performance.” FELDMAN, supra note 1, 
at § 4.04[C] Gap Fillers 4-19 (2d ed. 2006 Supp.); see, e.g., U.C.C § 2-308 Official Cmt. 4.   
55 Even in 1963 it was acknowledged that Section 2-207 probably addresses “the most technical 
concept Article 2 assails . . . [namely,] the attack made upon . . . the common law concept that the terms 
of an acceptance must match those of the offer exactly.”  William B. Davenport, How to Handle Sales 
of Goods, 19 BUS. LAW. 75 (1963-1964).  When it has been lamented that “[i]t is a sad fact that many 
sales contracts are not fully bargained,” by the likes of White and Summers, how can we expect courts 
not to think similarly, focusing on the lack of negotiation rather than the efficiency of standard-form 
exchanges?  See WHITE, supra note 50 at § 1-3.  
56 See infra Part VI.  
57 Keating, supra note 2.  
2010 BATTLE OF THE FORMS 11 
                                                          
under 2-207.58  Although he sought people that he felt should have the most 
experience with the battle of the forms,59 he found that most of the people he 
talked to had surprisingly little experience dealing with the issue.60  This fact goes 
to the heart of the first assumption, that “The Battle-of-the-Forms Provision Is a 
Significant Issue for Companies That Buy and Sell Goods.”61  The second 
assumption, which was agreed to by the interviewees, is that “When Companies 
Do Engage in the Battle of the Forms, They Do So Because It Is Efficient.”62  The 
third assumption, that “Parties Uniformly Draft Their Forms to Be as One-Sided as 
Possible in Their Favor”63 is the most similar assumption to one of the academic 
concerns identified above by Keating, and will be addressed in the next section and 
the model below.  The fourth and final assumption is that “Nobody Reads the 
Forms.”64  The varied response to this final assumption will also play a role in the 
model below (perfect versus incomplete information).65   
Critically, the interviewees asserted three major points.  First, one reason the 
battle of the forms is not very common is that some mega retailers (e.g. Wal-
Mart)66 are so powerful that they can make one-sided, “take it or leave it” 
contracts.67  Second, people prefer a straightforward, quick defaulting rule to get to 
the U.C.C. gap-fillers.68  (And parties actually did read the boilerplate language in 
certain situations).69  Third, and most importantly, if there was a term that was 
58 Id. at 2681.  
59 For who Keating chose to interview and why, see id. at 2692-95.  
60 Id. at 2696. 
61 Keating, supra note 2.  
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 See infra n.82 and accompanying text. 
66 Keating, supra note 2, at 2702, 2714.  “What is interesting about . . . large companies is that 
[they] have a more or less take-it-or-leave-it approach to their forms.  Thus, the battle of the forms ends 
up being not very relevant to a company . . . that has the leverage to insist on the other side signing its 
form.”  Id. at 2702.  This is true, and Baird would probably agree, see supra note 5; however, the reason 
that these large companies use less adversarial language is not because “the other side is [more] likely 
to read the form,” instead (to agree with Keating’s interviewee) the reason for the more reasonable 
terms in the boilerplate language is to gain efficiency, “namely [this] saves the company time arguing 
over things that you are going to end up losing anyway in negotiations.”  Id.
67 Extreme examples such as this overcome or sidestep the battle of the forms because they do not 
involve conflicting forms.  Instead, they require the use of a “master agreement” over which there can 
be no conflicting language.  Id. at 2697.  See also Craswell, supra note 8 (discussing partially 
negotiated and take-it-or-leave-it contracts).  Nevertheless, the strategy of a take-it-or-leave-it 
boilerplate will not be the same for a party who does not have the bargaining power to demand such 
terms.  Because some scholars have not accounted for the variation in bargaining power of boilerplate-
language users, they recognized the “more reasonable” (i.e. less one sided, or less adversarial) language 
of the take-it-or-leave-it contract as a trend towards more reasonable language being used overall in the 
battle of the forms.  In reality what has occurred is that firms with suitable bargaining power have been 
able to offer more reasonable terms when they are removed from the battle-of-the-forms game because 
of their bargaining power, see infra Part III, and pp. 120-122, regarding the take-it-or-leave-it game.  
Those still embroiled in the battle of the forms, on the other hand, are left subject to different incentives, 
see infra Part IV, Section 3.  For a discussion of bargaining power in exchange relations see WERNER Z.
HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS 124-26 (3d ed. 1999). 
68 Keating, supra note 2, at 2712. 
69 Id. at 2703. 
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negotiated, that would normally be found in the boilerplate language, it was 
Consequential Damages.70  These findings provide valuable insight into the 
workings of Section 2-207 as shall be seen below. 
III. ADVERSARIAL STRATEGY
A question raised by some scholars is: Why is there adversarial boilerplate 
language?71  A lot of boilerplate language is designed to induce the other party to 
accept its terms.  In acknowledgement forms, this strategy gets forms 
automatically into the Subsection (1) proviso (and past Subsection [2]) of 2-207, 
and ensures that a client is never “accepting” unfavorable, one-sided terms.  The 
process perpetuates the making of counter offers.  In other words, parties are 
intentionally defaulting to Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 and the gap fillers, and 
not allowing their contracts to be interpreted under Subsection (2), ensuring they 
are put in the least-worst outcome possible.   
Parties are trying to act optimally under Section 2-207.  Drafters of 
boilerplate language implement strategy to ensure that their clients do not “lose,” 
or are at least put in the least-worst position for all possible future outcomes.  
Keating has a good notion of what it means to ‘win’ the battle of the forms:72
[A]ny commercial lawyer who stepped back for a minute and assessed the practical 
impact of [Section 2-207] vis-à-vis the common law would quickly come to a 
number of conclusions.  First, whether you represent the offeror or the offeree, you 
can (and arguably should) include the magic language [e.g., language matching the 
2-207(1) proviso] in your form that will greatly limit the likelihood that you will 
get stuck with the other side’s boilerplate terms . . . .
. . . .  
By using the magic language, you put yourself in a position where the worst place 
you end up regarding the boilerplate terms, should you choose to perform, is with 
the U.C.C. gap-fillers.  But that brings you to your second conclusion: this whole 
new approach, compared to the common law, raises the stakes on the U.C.C. gap-
fillers, so you had better know what they are in order to determine whether you are 
truly comfortable with them . . . .
. . . .  
70 Id. at 2698, 2704.  “[T]he company will insist on a limitation of liability that is appropriate to the 
relatively small benefit that it is getting out of the sale.”  Id. at 2702.  
71 For the purposes of Section 2-207, I define adversarial boilerplate language as, subsection (1) 
proviso-conforming language for sellers, and subsection (2)(a) and (c) conforming language for buyers.  
Reasonable language in this case would mean forms which do not include such 2-207 subsection 
satisfying language, but which may otherwise still be drafted with preferential terms.  For the purposes 
of the take-it-or-leave-it game, where Section 2-207 does not apply, I define adversarial language as 
one-sided, unaccommodating terms.  Reasonable language in this case would mean accommodating or 
less-preferential terms. 
72  “[D]efine ‘winning’ as making the other side be held to your nondickered terms.  By the same 
token, it is easy with good drafting never to lose the battle of the forms, at least if ‘losing’ equals letting 
your side get stuck with the other party’s boilerplate terms.”  Keating, supra note 2, at 2682.  See infra 
note 74 and accompanying text. 
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The third practical conclusion that a thoughtful commercial lawyer would reach 
about the U.C.C.’s approach to the battle of the forms is that there is simply no way 
for either side to ensure victory in this fight, at least if victory is defined as getting 
the other side to be bound by your boilerplate terms rather than theirs.73
Thus, the outcomes of this game can be thought of as follows: Win, have 
your preferential terms used; Lose, have the other party’s terms applied; or 
Default, using the Subsection (1) proviso to get to Subsection (3), so that matching 
boilerplate language forms the contract, and non-matching terms are knocked out 
and replaced with the U.C.C. gap fillers.74
Of course, no one can do worse than defaulting to the gap fillers, if the 
parties play their cards correctly.  Using backwards induction, one can see the 
parties’ payoffs, and infer from them how these players’ decisions inform the 
results.75  In creating the model described below in Part V, values were assigned to 
certain outcomes, which largely align with these win, lose, and default situations.   
IV. GAME THEORY 
It is impossible to teach game theory from scratch in a few pages.  Readers 
familiar with game theory, or who have an intermediate text on the subject readily 
available should move ahead to the model, in Part V below.  This following is only 
73 Id. at 2686.   
If you are the offeror, you can specifically limit the terms of your offer to the 
terms that are included therein, and while you are at it, you can object in advance 
to any additional or different terms that the offeree might include in its purported 
acceptance of your offer.  If you are the offeree, you can mimic the language of 
Section 2-207(1) and expressly condition your acceptance on the offeror’s assent 
to any additional or different terms that you have included in your acceptance. 
Id.  “If you represent buyers, this is probably not a bad place to be since the U.C.C. gap-fillers 
include fairly broad warranty and remedy provisions, including implied warranty of merchantability, 
[U.C.C. § 2-314], and generous consequential damages [U.C.C. § 2-715(2)].”  Keating, supra note 2, at 
2686.     
You can, of course, try to ensure victory by refusing to perform your side of the 
contract until the other side signs on to the terms of your form.  At that point, 
though, you would end up with a real negotiated contract and it would no longer 
be a true battle of the forms. 
Id.   
[N]either side is ultimately forced to play by the other side’s terms in this battle. . 
. .  by insisting on a fully negotiated contract signed by both sides, or by [refusing 
to act]. . . [N]ot playing the game has its own costs.  Perhaps this is a sale that 
you really want to make, albeit not on the buyer’s terms.  Or perhaps you feel 
that it would be too expensive, given the fairly small size of the deal or the 
limited risk involved, to sit down and negotiate about nonimmediate terms that 
are unlikely to matter in the end anyway.
Id. at 2687.
74 Keating, supra note 2, at 2682-85.  Although Keating states that one may think of the battle of 
the forms as a game, and in so doing provides these as the win, lose, and default strategies, he does not, 
it would seem, mean a game in the same way that game theorists do; “[i]f you think of the battle of the 
forms as a game, it is much more analogous to tic-tac-toe than it is to chess.”  Id. at 2682.  Nevertheless, 
chess, from a game theory perspective, is basically impossible to model, and although tic-tac-toe may 
be a good example of a game demonstrating a ‘default,’ it would be more accurate to compare the battle 
of the forms to the prisoner’s dilemma with a Nash Equilibrium and strategic behavior.   
75 For an example of backward induction see POSNER, infra note 186, at 19. 
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meant to provide a brief tour of the subject matter as addressed in this article.   
“Game theory is the study of multiperson decision problems.”76  An example 
of a multiperson decision problem is whether, when exchanging forms, it is better 
for each party to use adversarial or reasonable language in their respective standard 
forms.  Consider the following game in which two players exchange forms 
simultaneously: 77
Player 2
A’ R’
Player 1 
A 1  , 1 (NE) 2 ,  0 
R 1  ,  1 0  ,  2
In this game, Player 1’s payoff is always the first of the two numbers in each 
box, while the second number goes to Player 2.  Player 1 can only choose between 
A and R, while Player 2 can only choose between A’ or R’.  Each player can only 
make one choice, and the players must make their move simultaneously.  What 
will be the outcome of the game?  Consider Player 1’s options.  If Player 1 chooses 
A, and Player 2 chooses A’, Player 1 will receive 1; however, if Player 2 chooses 
R’, Player 1 will receive 2.  If Player 1 chooses R, and Player 2 chooses A’, Player 
1 will receive 1; however, if Player 2 chooses R’, Player 1 will receive 0.  Keeping 
in mind that Player 1 does not get to tell Player 2 what to choose, compare Player 
1’s options of moving A versus moving R, regardless of what Player 2 does.  
You’ll notice that if Player 2 chooses A’, Player 1 is indifferent as to its strategy, 
since playing both A and R would result in the same payoff for Player 1: 1.  If, 
however, Player 2 picks R’, Player 1 would be better off playing A’ and, receiving 
                                                          
76 ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS at xi-xii (1992).  
77 When two or more people (“players”) face a decision problem (i.e., they must make a “move” in 
a “game”), we can classify the game as “static” (i.e., the game requires simultaneous decision making) 
or “dynamic” (consecutive decision making).  Each game in this paper has “complete” information, 
which means that each player knows the possible outcomes (“payoffs”) for all the players.  Information 
in a game is further characterized as either “perfect” or “imperfect”.  Perfect information means that 
each player knows what moves have been made by all other players at every given point in the game, 
whereas in an imperfect information type of game, this is not the case (such as in a one-shot 
simultaneous swapping of forms).  One can depict games with “game trees” or rubrics.  When one 
draws a game tree, he is said to have drawn the game in its “extensive” form.  When the game is 
presented in a rubric, it is said to be in its “normal” form.  The model in this paper is presented in both 
forms in appendices C and D.  See infra Appendices C-D.  Unfortunately there is no way to show the 
difference between perfect and imperfect information in a normal form representation, so I have only 
included extensive form representations in the text itself.  Some of the more advanced terminology I use 
in the next section of the paper (sub games, information sets, singleton information sets) is not 
necessary to follow the basic outcomes of the model, and therefore will be left to other dedicated texts.  
For this paper, one need only know how to solve a normal form game to discover the outcomes of the 
model.  Backwards induction is a method of solving games, which just means that one starts at the end, 
looking at payoffs, and works back to the beginning, looking at the potential moves, to solve the game. 
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a payoff of 2, instead of 0, which would result from playing R.  With this in mind, 
consider Player 2’s possible strategies.  If Player 1 were to select A, Player 2 would 
definitely be better off having played A’ and receiving 1 than if it played R’ and 
received a payoff of 0.  Conversely if Player 1 played R, Player 2 would definitely 
be better off having played R’ and receiving 2, rather than playing A’ and receiving 
1.  Examining the two player’s strategy reveals only one overlapping strategy 
between the two.  If Player 1 plays A and Player 2 plays A’, each player will 
receive 1, and neither player could make a unilaterally different move and achieve 
a better outcome.  Furthermore, there is no Pareto dominant position that they 
could move to.  Keep in mind that Player 2 does not get to tell Player 1 what to 
choose, and vice versa.  Since we know that each player has a move in mind that—
regardless of the other players’ move—will give it the least-worst payoff, there is a 
predicable outcome to the game; we call the congruence of these strategies the 
equilibrium solution to the game, or Nash Equilibrium.  For your convenience, I 
have underlined the players’ best moves above.  Notice that only one box has both 
payoffs underlined.  Keep in mind that Player 1 only gets to choose the row, and 
Player 2 only gets to choose the column.  I have provided normal form 
representations of my model in Appendix D for your convenience.   
V. MODEL78
For the purposes of this model, in all situations involving two forms, let us 
define adversarial language for the buyer as meaning inclusion of subsection (2)(a) 
and (c) language, whereas for the seller, adversarial language means inclusion of 
subsection (1) proviso-conforming language.  In these situations, reasonable forms 
are defined as those that do not contain this adversarial language.  Because there is 
only one form in the take-it-or-leave-it scenario, Section 2-207 does not apply, and 
for this reason, in a take-it-or-leave-it situation alone, adversarial simply means 
one-sided, preferential terms and reasonable means accommodating.   
1. Setting Up the Game: Payoffs and Assumptions 
To assign payoffs to the various outcomes of the battle of the forms and 
related scenarios, I have made a number of assumptions that I will lay out in this 
section.  To begin, let us assume that in each of the games, when no contract is 
formed, each player receives a naught payoff of 0.  Assume that a contract can 
only be formed when both players negotiate or both players send forms.  When one 
player negotiates and the other sends a form, no contract is formed. 
With regards to negotiations, assume that there are two types of contracts.  
One type has a high potential benefit for each player of 4, BH = 4, while the other 
type has a lower potential benefit of only 1, BL = 1.  If negotiations always cost 2 
for each player, CN = 2, parties will only choose to negotiate when the potential 
benefit is high, and the outcome will provide a utility level of 2 for each party: BH -
CN = 2.  If the parties choose to negotiate a contract with low-worth potential, then 
78 See infra pp. 56-57 and accompanying illustrations.  
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taking the cost of negotiating away from the lower benefit would leave each party 
with a utility level of -1: BL - CN = -1.  Thus, negotiating can lead to three possible 
payoffs: 2, 0, or -1. 
Under the battle of the forms, parties save the costs of negotiation and 
merely trade forms (which have a sunk cost), so they can achieve a benefit even 
with the lower potential benefit type of contract since, BL – 0 = 1.  Let us assume 
that if a player could win the battle of the forms, that player would capture the 
other player’s benefit, and receive a payoff of 2.  Thus the loser of the battle of the 
forms would receive a naught benefit of 0.  Thus there are three potential payoffs 
in the battle of the forms: 2, 1, or 0. 
When could these payoffs be reached in the battle of the forms?  As will be 
shown, the players could only win the battle of the forms if the other player used 
an irrational strategy.  When a seller includes adversarial language in the 
acknowledgment form, let us assume that no contract is formed under Section 2-
207(1), but that the parties perform as though there is a contract such that a court 
would apply subsection (3), and a relatively neutral contract would be formed 
under the knock-out rule and gap fillers.  In this default situation, neither party 
wins or loses; both parties share the benefit of the bargain, so each receives a basic 
payoff of 1.  If the seller sends a reasonable-language form, a contract would be 
formed under Section 2-207(1) and interpreted under Section 2-207(2).  If a buyer 
used adversarial language and the seller did not, the buyer would get its 
preferential terms [under Sections 2-207(2)(a) and (2)(c)] and would capture the 
winning payoff, 2, while the seller, being subjected to the buyer’s terms would still 
lose the benefit of the bargain, getting the losing payoff, 0.  If the buyer did not 
include the adversarial language in its form, the seller would be able to have some 
terms enter the contract via Section 2-207(2), so long as they do not materially 
alter the contract as interpreted under Section 2-207(2)(b).  Official comment five 
of Section 2-207 gives examples of some terms that are considered non-material, 
but which would nevertheless constitute a victory for the seller if included in the 
contract, such as shifting the responsibilities and thus the costs of inspection onto 
the buyer when the goods are for a sub-sale and reasonably limit remedies.  For 
this reason, in that situation, I assign a winning payoff of 2 for the seller, and a 
losing payoff of 0 for the buyer.   
In the model below, there are four sub-games that are divided vertically by 
bargaining power and horizontally by the cost-benefit analysis of negotiation.79
Assume that Player 1 is a buyer, and Player 2 is a seller, of widgets.  In the 
extensive form of the model,80 P1 > P2 means that the bargaining power of Player 
1 exceeds that of Player 2; P1 = P2 means that the bargaining power of the players 
is comparable; BN1  > CN1 means that for Player 1 the benefit of negotiation 
outweighs the cost of negotiation; BN1 < CN1 means that for Player 1 the benefit of 
79 At least for some sales contracts, the costs of reviewing and then negotiating about 
nonimmediate terms are simply not worth the benefit, given the low likelihood of a future dispute about 
these terms and the relatively low cost of losing such a dispute if there is one.  The overwhelming 
majority of company representatives with whom I spoke would agree with the academics on this one.  
Keating, supra note 2, at 2699. 
80 Presented in full form in Appendix C.  
2010 BATTLE OF THE FORMS 17 
                                                          
negotiation does not outweigh the cost of negotiation; BN1,2 > CN1,2 means that for 
both players, the benefit of negotiation outweighs the cost of negotiation; finally, 
BN1,2 < CN1,2 means that for both players, the benefit of negotiation does not 
outweigh the cost of negotiation.81  Each player has limited actions: negotiate, N; 
send a form that is reasonable, R, or adversarial, A; or Player 1 could send a form 
that is one-sided, A, or not, R, and then Player 2 can take, T, or leave, L, the other 
player’s form; and each only gets one opportunity to move.   
Please keep in mind that when two forms are exchanged, adversarial 
language, A, is defined for Player 1 as language which comports with Section 2-
207(2)(a) and (c), and for Player 2 as language which conforms to the Subsection 
(1) proviso.  R does not include the strategic language of subsection (2)(a) and (c) 
for Player 1, or the subsection (1) proviso for Player 2 when there are two forms 
involved.  When only one form is in play, and Section 2-207 is not being applied, 
adversarial language, A, means that one-sided preferential terms are used, and 
reasonable language, R, means that accommodating terms are used.  If the players 
exchange forms, it will be assumed that they are sent simultaneously (or, 
equivalently, not read) and acted upon such that, if necessary, a court would be 
able to apply Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 to determine what terms form the 
contract.82   
2. Take it or leave it 
In the take-it-or-leave-it game,83 Player 1 submits a form, as an offer, to 
Player 2, which Player 2 may then accept or reject, i.e., take or leave.  The take-it-
or-leave-it scenario occurs when Player 1 has greater bargaining power than Player 
2, and the contract is not of a high enough value to make the benefit of negotiating 
outweigh the cost of negotiating, i.e., when P1 > P2, and BN1 < CN1.  The take-it-
or-leave-it game is a dynamic game of complete and perfect information (so the 
strongest equilibrium concept that can be applied is a subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium).84  The game has three singleton information sets. 
The game, G, has two players with actions, A, and payoffs, u: 
G = {A1, A2 ; u1, u2}.   
The set of possible actions for Player 1: A1 = {N, R, A}.   
The set of possible actions for Player 2: A2 = {N’, T’, L’}. 
The possible payoffs for are u1 (-1, 0, 1) for Player 1 and u2 (-1, 0, 1) for 
Player 2.  The game proceeds as follows: 
1.  Player 1 chooses an action a1 from the feasible set A1 = {N, R, A}. 
2.  Player 2 observes a1,85 and then P2 chooses a2 from the feasible set A2 = 
81 Where BN = {BH, BL}; if BN > CN, BN = BH; if BN < CN, BN = BL.
82 A reasonable form will accept (or be agreeable to) the terms of its counterpart.  An adversarial 
term will not.  Therefore, the court will only have to apply the gap fillers when two adversarial terms 
are sent. 
83 See infra Appendix C.  The take-it-or-leave-it game is represented in quadrant III of the normal 
form illustration. 
84 See generally GIBBONS, supra note 72, at 57-71 (1992). 
85 By reading the form P1 sends (or seeing that P1 is willing to negotiate, which P1 would not 
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{N’, T’, L’}. 
To compute the backwards-induction outcome of the take-it-or-leave-it 
game, begin at the second stage (i.e., Player 2’s move).  Player 2 has three 
singleton information sets.  Player 1 must anticipate what Player 2 will select to do 
upon reaching each of these information sets.  If Player 1 chooses A, Player 2 faces 
a choice between a payoff of 0 from N’ and L’, or a payoff of -1 from T’, so N’ or 
L’ is optimal.  If Player 1 plays A, and Player 2 plays N’ or L’, Player 1 would 
yield a payoff of 0.  If Player 1 chooses R, Player 2 faces a choice between a 
payoff of 0 from N’ and L’, or 1 from T’, so T’ is optimal.  If Player 1 chooses R 
and Player 2 plays T’, Player 1 would yield a payoff of 1.  If Player 1 chooses N, 
Player 2 faces a choice between a payoff of 0 from T’ and L’, or 1 from N’, so N’ 
is optimal.  If Player 1 chooses N and Player 2 plays N’, Player 1 would yield a 
payoff of -1.  The first-stage choice for Player 1 therefore is between payoffs of 0 
from A, 1 from R, and -1 from N, so R is optimal. (R, T’; 1, 1) is the Pareto 
dominant Nash equilibrium over (A, N’; 0, 0) and (A, L’; 0, 0) Nash equilibria.86   
Thus in the take-it-or-leave-it scenario, it is efficient for a powerful buyer, 
such as Wal-Mart, to offer a purchase order with reasonable, less-one sided terms 
to less-powerful sellers when the bargain is of insufficient value to carry the costs 
of negotiation.  
                                                          
since that would only occur in a negotiating game), P2 can tell whether P1’s form is reasonable or 
adversarial.  P2 can read P1’s form because only P1 can send a form in this game, which P2 can take or 
leave.  Thus, simultaneity of form exchange is not an issue.  See infra text accompanying note 90. 
86 For some readers, these three equilibria can be easily derived from the normal form 
representation of the game, see quadrant III of the normal form representation of the game, see infra p. 
48.  Please note that the definition of adversarial language in the take-it-or-leave-it scenario does not 
require the magic language of Section 2-207 because there is only one form.   
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3. Negotiations 
Negotiations occur when the benefit of the bargain would sustain the costs of 
negotiation, allowing Player 1 and Player 2 to negotiate the terms of their 
contracts.87  The negotiation-based games are dynamic games of complete but 
imperfect information,88 which have one singleton and one nonsingleton 
information set, and occur when BN1 > CN.89   
The game is: G = {A1, A2 ; u1, u2}.
The set of possible actions for Player 1: A1 = {N, R, A}. 
The set of possible actions for Player 2: A2 = {N’, R’, A’}. 
The possible payoffs for Player 1 are u1 (0, 1, 2) and u2 (0, 1, 2) for Player 2.  
The game proceeds as follows: 
1.  Player 1 chooses an action a1 from the feasible set A1 = {N, R, A}. 
2.  Player 2 observes whether (a1) = (N) or not,90 and then chooses a2 from 
the feasible set A2 = {N’, R’, A’}. 
begin at the second stage (i.e., Player 2’s move).  Player 2 has one singleton and 
                                                          
To compute the backwards-induction outcome for the negotiation games, 
87 See infra p. 48.  The negotiations games occur in the first and second quadrants of the normal 
form illustration. 
88 Therefore, the strongest equilibrium concept that can be applied to them is a subgame-perfect 
Nash equilibrium.  See generally GIBBONS, supra note 84, at 115-29.   
89 Because these games end in negotiated contracts, these contracts are functionally complete, See
Eggleston, supra note 16. 
90 Player 2 can tell if Player 1 wants to negotiate, but will not have an opportunity to read Player 
1’s form if Player 1 sends a form.  Form exchange is simultaneous.  See supra text accompanying note 
85. 
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 of the relative bargaining powers of the two parties, 
they 
4. Battle of the forms 
The battle of the forms arises when the parties exchange forms.91  For the 
purpo
}.
r 1: A1 = {N, R, A}. 
. 
2 (-1, 0, 1, 2) for 
Playe
e feasible set A1 = {N, R, A}. 
 from the 
                                                          
one nonsingleton information set.  There is only one subgame; it begins at Player 
2’s decision node following N by Player 1.  If Player 1 does not choose N, Player 2 
will know that Player 1 has chosen either R or A, but will not know which was 
played.  Player 2 then chooses between three actions: N’, R’, or A’, after which the 
game ends.  If Player 2 reaches the decision node following N by Player 1, then 2’s 
best response is to play N’ (which yields payoffs of 2) rather than to play A’ or R’ 
(which yields a payoff of 0).  If Player 1 does not play N, Player 2 will need to 
make a decision without knowing whether Player 1 chose A or R.  Using a process 
of iteration elimination of strictly dominated strategies, Player 2 can determine that 
Player 1 would play A, since Player 1 can do better, but not worse, regardless of 
what Player 2 plays, under A than under R.  Therefore, using a process of iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, choosing A’ dominates picking R’ or 
N’.  Since Player 1 can anticipate Player 2’s payoffs and can solve Player 2’s 
problem just as well as Player 2, Player 1’s problem at the outset will be to decide 
between playing A (which would yield a payoff of 1, after Player 2 plays A’), R 
(which would yield a payoff of 0, after Player 2 plays A’), or N (which would yield 
a payoff of 2, after Player 2 plays N’).  Thus Player 1’s best response to the 
anticipated behavior of Player 2 is to play N, so the backwards-induction outcome 
of the game is (N, N’; 2, 2).   
Accordingly, regardless
should negotiate contracts rather than exchange forms when the benefits of 
the negotiation would outweigh the costs. 
ses of the model, it is assumed that the forms themselves do not create a 
contract when adversarial language is used, but that the parties still act as if a 
contract has been formed.  Thus no contract is formed under Subsection (1) of 
Section 2-207; however, assuming they fall within the Section 2-207(1) proviso, a 
contract is formed by the court under Section 2-207(3).  The battle-of-the-forms 
game is a dynamic game of complete but imperfect information (and so the 
strongest equilibrium concept that can be applied is a subgame-perfect Nash 
equilibrium),92 which has one singleton and one nonsingleton information set, and 
occurs when P1 = P2, and BN < CN.
The game is: G= {A1, A2 ; u1, u2
The set of possible actions for Playe
The set of possible actions for Player 2: A2 = {N’, R’, A’}
The possible payoffs for Player 1 are u1 (-1, 0, 1, 2) and u
r 2.  The game proceeds as follows: 
Player 1 chooses an action a1 from th
Player 2 observes whether (a1) = (N) or not,93 and then chooses a2
91 See infra p. 48.  The battle of the forms occurs in quadrant IV of the normal form illustration. 
her Player 1 has played N, but, since form 
92 See generally GIBBONS, supra note 84, at 115-29.   
93 As in the negotiation game, Player 2 can tell whet
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feasib
o compute the backwards-induction outcome of the battle of the forms, one 
begins at the second stage (i.e., Player 2’s move).  Player 2 has one singleton and 
one n
outset will be to decide between playing A’ (which would yield a payoff of 1, 
                                                          
le set A2 = {N’, R’, A’}. 
T
onsingleton information set.  There is only one subgame; it begins at Player 
2’s decision node following N by Player 1.  If Player 1 does not choose N, Player 2 
will know that Player 1 has chosen either R or A, but will not know which was 
played.  Player 2 then chooses between three actions: N’, R’, or A’, after which the 
game ends.  If Player 2 reaches the decision node following N by Player 1, then 2’s 
best response is to play R’ or A’ (which yields payoffs of 0) rather than to play N’ 
(which yields a payoff of -1).  Player 1 would not play N, because A strictly 
dominates N as a strategy.  Since Player 1 does not play N, Player 2 will need to 
make a decision without knowing whether Player 1 chose A or R.  This constitutes 
a static subgame of complete but imperfect information.  In this subgame, Player 1 
has two strategies and Player 2 has three: S1 = {A, R} and S2 = {A’, R’, N’}.  
Using iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, Player 2 can see that R’ 
strictly dominates N’, so no rational player would play N’.  Knowing Player 2 is 
rational, Player 1 can eliminate N’ from Player 2’s strategy space.  Looking at the 
remaining game, each player can see what the best play would be given the other 
players remaining strategies.  Since Player 2 can anticipate Player 1’s payoffs and 
can solve Player 1’s problem just as well as Player 1, Player 2’s problem at the 
exchange is simultaneous, Player 2 cannot read Player 1’s form before sending the exchange form.  See
supra note 90.  
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1. The Courts’ Misunderstanding of Strategic Language 
This section presents the argument that courts have mistaken the use of 
strate pt to gain an 
uneven advantage and push costs onto the courts.  The language of the courts is 
exam
 the seller “elects”95 to “insert into his standard sales 
ackno
regardless of what Player 1 plays), or R’ (which would yield a payoff of 2, if 
Player 1 plays R, or 0 if Player 1 plays A).  Since Player 1 can anticipate Player 2’s 
payoffs and can solve Player 2’s problem just as well as Player 2, Player 1’s 
problem at the outset will be to decide between playing A (which would yield a 
payoff of 1, if Player 2 plays A’, or 2 if Player 2 plays R’), or R (which would 
yield a payoff of 0, after Player 2 plays R’, or 1 if Player 2 plays A’).  Player 1’s 
best response to the anticipated behavior of Player 2 is to play A, since Player 2 
would play A’ in that case, because Player 2 could not improve its payoff by 
changing its move, and thus would give Player 1 a payoff of 1.  Player 2’s best 
response to the anticipated behavior of Player 1 is to play A’, since Player 1 would 
play A in response, since Player 1 could not improve its position by playing a 
different move when Player 2 plays A’.  Even though neither A nor A’ strictly 
dominates R or R’, neither player has an incentive to change its move given the 
other players best strategy.  If each player plays this best response to the other’s, 
there is no move which could be played that would be Pareto dominant, thus there 
is a unique Nash Equilibrium to the subgame: (A, A’; 1, 1); this is also the sub-
game perfect Nash Equilibrium of the Battle of the Forms.   
Therefore, when the parties have relatively similar bargaining power, and the 
costs of negotiation outweigh the benefits, the parties should exchange forms 
containing adversarial, proviso-conforming language. 
VI. IMPACT
gic language by parties in battle-of-the-form disputes as an attem
ined to infer underlying assumptions, in part to see where those assumptions 
line up with assumptions made by academics, and in part to show that if the courts 
adopted the understanding presented in this paper – that the gap fillers are an 
equilibrium default for the battle of the forms – the application of Section 2-207 
could be more predictable.   
The Seventh Circuit, in C. Itoh, implies that the reader might find that its 
conclusion results as unfairly prejudicial to the seller.94  It begins to offer its 
position by pointing out that
wledgement form96 the statement that acceptance is expressly conditional on 
                                                          
94 C. Itoh & Co., 552 F.2d at 1237.  
95 Id.  Use of the word “elects” points to the court’s belief that use of the proviso-conforming 
language is a voluntary attempt to have one’s cake and eat it too.  See infra note 100 and accompanying 
text. use of the adversarial language is the best strategy and not a 
cho
  As has been shown, however, the 
ice for a drafter whose clients are partaking in lower value contracts that could result in the battle of 
the forms.  That the court puts weight on the “voluntary” aspect of this matter is validated a few 
sentences down on the next page: “whether or not a seller will be disadvantaged under Subsection (3) as 
a consequence of inserting an ‘expressly conditional’ clause in his standard form is within his control.”
C. Itoh & Co., 552 F.2d at 1238 (emphasis added). 
96 One wonders if this statement would be made if the court considered that the acknowledgment 
form was drafted under the belief that the form would be used in a battle-of-the-forms scenario.  If the 
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en shown, however, the use of the proviso-conforming language is 
not an
“consequence” to “bear”;104 there is just a default result that is reached.  The 
buyer’s assent to additional terms contained therein.”97  The court asserts that the 
seller obtains a substantial benefit under Section 2-207(1) by including the 
clause.98  The court also states that: “If the seller does intend to close a deal 
irrespective of whether or not the buyer assents to the additional terms,99 he can 
hardly complain” when Section 2-207(3) is applied, thus knocking out the 
conflicting terms.100  The court pointed out that “a seller . . . would undoubtedly 
appreciate the dual advantage” of falling under proviso of Section 2-207(1) and 
getting preferential treatment under Section 2-207(3).101  Finally, the court says 
that the seller may take “advantage of an ‘expressly conditional’ clause under 
Section 2-207(1) when he elects not to perform[; therefore,] he must accept the 
potential risk under Subsection (3) of not getting his additional terms when he 
elects to proceed with performance without first obtaining buyer’s assent to those 
terms.”102  Using this line of argument the court determines that “[s]ince the seller 
injected ambiguity into the transaction by inserting the ‘expressly conditional’ 
clause in his form, he, and not the buyer, should bear the consequence of that 
ambiguity under Subsection (3).”103  In short, the court believes that, by using a 
form with adversarial and proviso-conforming language the seller’s drafter is 
trying to have his cake and eat it too; therefore, the seller should bear the brunt of 
the gap fillers. 
As has be
 attempt to gain dual benefits; to the contrary, by using the clause, the drafter 
actually sought certainty in the contract.  Application of Section 2-207(3) should 
not be seen as a punishment for not negotiating (except as to consequential 
damages, which I will distinguish in Part VI, Section 4, below).  There is no 
                                                          
court assumed, as this article suggests, that a drafter must (out of a duty to the client) include the 
language (see supra note 95), the tenor of the statement would likely be different.  
97 Id. at 1237.  Keep in mind the end of including this language, to ensure that the client’s form 
falls
t a 
ben
note 
98. 
100 The court points out that a party should not expect to have its cake and eat it too.  Again one 
wonder
 the 
prud
  This argument mistakes Section 2-207(3) as a risk to the seller, when instead, it is a certain 
bac
see discussion infra p. 144 (arguing that consequential damages are a penalty default rule in 
 into the 2-207(1) proviso and to get the least-worst available contract under Section 2-207(3).   
98 Id. 1237-38.  Of course, there is a benefit.  However, the benefit they get is certitude, not jus
efit of backing out.  A good drafter must assume that his form will be used by the client without 
consideration of what it says or means, and so must make sure that an automaton client, that just sends 
forms off is put into a position with the most certain and least-worst outcome.  See supra note 35. 
99 This is something an automaton client with a drafter’s form would want to do.  See supra
s if the court would approach this differently if it considered that the drafter had Section 2-207 
in mind when creating the boilerplate language.  Such a party would not complain about this judgment.  
Perhaps as the courts and business parties (and their lawyers) learn about the Section and the strategies 
that are best under different business scenarios, (inferred and actual) complaints would be dropped. 
101 C. Itoh & Co., 552 F.2d at 1238.  Of course this would be great for the seller, but again,
ent drafter would know that this would not be the outcome, and would not change the strategic 
language. 
102 Id.
kstop.  Section 2-207(3) provides the endpoint in the game from which the seller can use backwards 
induction to determine which “move” is best to make; send a friendly form or one that demands 
acceptance.  The court did not mention that a drafter could employ such language to ensure that other 
worse scenarios did not arise for the automaton client.     
103 Id.
104 But
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lied the reasoning in C. Itoh to another case in which it was necessary 
to de
eir contract.”109  As mentioned in the 
                                                          
drafter has ensured that the Gap Fillers would be used, and that the client would do 
no worse than that.  Had the drafter not used the adversarial language, the parties 
could have ended up with an ambiguous contract and would have been at the 
mercy of the court to apply the knockout rule and subsequent gap fillers under a 
different theory, e.g. under Section 2-207(2).105  So regardless of whether the 
outcome in C. Itoh was correct, the argument that bias against the seller is 
appropriate, because the insertion of ambiguity into the contract is wrong.  The 
seller’s drafter did just the opposite.  The drafter ensured the outcome before the 
first move of the game had been made.  Furthermore, the reason for ambiguity 
comes not from the drafting of the boilerplates, but rather the insufficient worth of 
the sale, which was not important enough to warrant a fully negotiated contract.  
The use of the boilerplate is a safety mechanism meant to protect the client.  It 
does this by ensuring the least-worst outcome.  This outcome is not ambiguous—it 
is specific.   
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit, in Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack 
Corp.,106 app
termine whether a term was part of a contract formed under Section 2-
207(3).107  The Ninth Circuit followed the U.C.C. drafters’ belief that “[b]ecause 
the [purchase order and acknowledgment] forms are oriented to the thinking of the 
respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do not 
correspond.”108  Although this statement may be true, it misses two fundamental 
issues.  First, it is, arguably, the drafters’ duty to write the standard form for the 
benefit of the client.  Drafting a form to be “one-sided” or oriented to one’s client 
is strategic, given the structure of Section 2-207, and not merely a foregone 
conclusion.  This is not the simple case of narrow, self-centered drafting.  This is a 
matter of understanding the ambiguity of the future and ensuring that the client is 
put in the least-worst possible and most predictable situation.  Second, that the 
terms do not coincide is just as attributable to the lack of term-by-term negotiation 
as it is to the absence of certainty (about the future with regard to the parties with 
whom forms would be exchanged and what terms would be contained on their 
boilerplates) when the forms were drafted.   
The Ninth Circuit stated that “[g]enerally, this result is fair because both 
parties are responsible for the ambiguity in th
con
f Subsection 
(3) 
amond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986). 
See also, U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1, infra p. 45.   
tract law, whereas the other gap fillers are efficient and probably majoritarian). 
105 It is possible that in some jurisdictions, a court will apply the knockout rule even i
is not reached by the Subsection (1) proviso, see, e.g. Diatom, Inc., supra note 42 at 1579-80 
(holding that a contract was formed under 2-207(1) but that the conflicting terms in offer and 
acceptance regarding period of limitations and applicable warranties cancelled one another out, thereby 
precluding summary judgment), but that does not mean a good drafter would want to leave the client in 
this less-certain position.  Some jurisdictions do not apply the knock-out rule and gap fillers under 
Subsection (2).  White and Summers have disagreed about when the rules should apply: White would 
look to Comment 6 to have the knock out rule and gap fillers applied to Subsection (2); Summers 
disagrees and says Subsection (2) only applies to additional terms, not different. See WHITE, supra note 
50, at 34. 
106 Di
107 Id. at 1442. 
108 Id. at 1442-43.
109 Id. at 1444. 
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discu
the co
ngly draft under.  The parties, 
or at 
ibility 
for th
                                                          
ssion of the C. Itoh justification, the parties are not injecting ambiguity into 
the transaction by drafting adversarial contracts, they are, rather, covering their 
losses by making certain that the endgame result is the least-worst default scenario.  
The Ninth Circuit continued: “The parties could have negotiated a contract and 
agreed on its terms, but for whatever reason, they failed to do so.  Therefore, 
neither party should get its terms.”110  As to this proposition, there are three issues.   
First, the Court presupposes that the reason for not negotiating is 
unimportant and that form exchanging is the reason for the supposed ambiguity.  If 
urts wish to encourage economically efficient transactions, then they must 
recognize that for many transactions the cost of negotiating term-by-term will 
outweigh the benefits of having a “clear” contract.111  It is evidenced by their 
choice of words that the court incorrectly saw the outcome of Section 2-207(3) as a 
type of “penalty”.112  This is mistaken from the strategic, game-theoretic point of 
view.  Under the automaton-client theory of drafting, the court is actually doing the 
drafters’ bidding, and is merely effectuating the true purpose of the drafter’s 
adversarial language, reaching the default position.   
Courts do not need to justify the application of this law as fair, because they 
are simply applying a working rule that parties knowi
least their lawyers, should know that this endgame is the logical outcome.  
Reaching that end has no significant moral implication—it is merely a matter of 
fact for business conducted under the U.C.C.  There is no reason to say, “you 
should have negotiated, but since you did not, neither of you gets what you 
wanted.”  Instead, the courts should assert that the parties’ drafters should know 
that there would be times when their clients could not economically justify term-
by-term negotiations, and when that happens the U.C.C. supplies a default for an 
efficiency-driven strategic game.  If the drafters have done their job, then that 
endgame will be reached, and the court will merely facilitate the endgame.   
Second, the Ninth Circuit explained that Subsection (3) “will often work to 
the disadvantage of the seller because he will ‘wish to undertake less respons
e quality of his goods than the Code imposes or else wish to limit his 
damages liability more narrowly than would the Code.’”113  Though it is true that 
the Code may be buyer biased in some respects, it is still the least-worst that a 
seller can do.114  The Court goes on to say that the application of the section is 
more equitable than the last-shot doctrine, and should be considered preferable 
given the statutory imposition of them (as opposed to imposition arising in 
saction costs “can be reduced by using standard forms.”  HIRSCH supra note 67, at 126. 
y.”  
Aga
, 794 F.2d at 1444.  
rs may be a disadvantage to sellers is important to the idea 
that
110 Id.
111 Tran
112 It is as though the court had said, “if you can’t get along, then neither of you will get your wa
in, to avoid ambiguity, the gap-fillers in general are not a penalty default position.  The only gap-
filler that I currently believe to be a penalty default is consequential damages, as discussed below in 
Part VI, Section 4.   
113 Diamond Fruit
114 That the application of the gap fille
 consequential damages are a penalty default rule, since the application is an incentive to negotiate 
as to that term, but parties can and do negotiate around this one gap filler, and the remaining gap fillers 
are largely efficient.  (Again, the consequential damages conversation, as the exception to the efficiency 
of the gap fillers, is reserved to Part VI, Sections 3-4, infra).
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 seller to assume more liability than it 
The seller is most responsible for the 
ude 
the adversarial language conforming to the Section 2-207(1) proviso in the 
autom
sactions conducted under the U.C.C. are not a game 
of tag
tinuum in the Take-It-Or-Leave-It Game: When is 
it Reasonable to be Accommodating? 
The es two curves, provided to give a 
visual representation of the topics that follow, and are not part of the game-
theore
would be lacking in any other situation.  Knowing that Player 1 has the superior 
                                                          
common law).115  Common law versus statutes aside, the equity of the matter 
again points to the Court’s apparent need to justify its holding rather than merely 
applying the law as it understands it.  With the model presented above in hand, 
courts can go forth, confidently understanding that this is meant to happen: this is 
what the parties expect and want.  Parties’ actions are predicated on the court 
applying this law—no further rationale should be necessary.   
Finally, the Ninth Circuit declared:  
[I]n a case such as this one, requiring the
intends is not altogether inappropriate.  
ambiguity because it inserts a term in its form that requires assent to additional 
terms and then does not enforce that requirement.  If the seller truly does not want 
to be bound unless the buyer assents to its terms, it can protect itself by not 
shipping until it obtains that assent.116   
This again illustrates the court’s confusion as to why a drafter would incl
aton-client’s form.  On its face, it may appear the drafter wants to have his 
cake and eat it too, but in reality, the adversarial language is the drafter’s 
mechanism for reaching Section 2-207(3) and ensuring that the endgame is played 
out in the manner predicted, fulfilling the duty to the client keeping them in the 
least-worst position possible.  
The Ninth Circuit got tantalizingly close to the nature of the issue when it 
said, “modern commercial tran
 or musical chairs.  Rather, if the parties exchange incompatible forms, ‘all of 
the terms on which the parties’ forms do not agree drop out, and the U.C.C. 
supplies the missing terms.”117  Modern commercial transactions are a game, but 
not a game of tag or musical chairs.  They are a game of strategic positioning to 
ensure that the U.C.C. gap fillers are reliably reached on contracts that are not 
negotiated term by term.
2. The “Reputation” Con
 complete model in Appendix C includ
tic annotation.  They were included to represent a continuum between certain 
nodes in the games that it is important to understand the relationship between.  The 
reputation curve applies only to the take-it-or-leave-it situation.118  In take it or 
leave it, Player 1 is uniquely situated to make an offer to Player 2 which is either 
accepted to form the contract or left on the table.  This superior position, which 
Player 1 enjoys, provides the drafters of Player 1’s form with information, which 
115 Diamond Fruit, 794 F.2d at 1445.  
116 Id.
117 Textile Unlimited, Inc., 240 F.3d at 788.  
118 See infra p. 47 and illustration. 
2010 BATTLE OF THE FORMS 27 
As has been shown in the model above, the gap fillers are a default, or 
equilibriu  fillers are a mostly efficient 
equilibrium in the battle of the forms.  Nevertheless, I will argue that there is a 
penal
position allows the drafters of Player 1’s boilerplate language to take advantage of 
the long-term benefits that can come from using accommodating, less one-sided 
terms, namely a boost to reputation (or at least it will not contribute to a bad 
reputation, which may be even more important).119  The model demonstrates the 
lose-lose situation that would arise if a seller accepted unreasonably one-sided 
boilerplate language from Player 1.  This is shown through the payoffs, -1 to 
Player 1 (because of a drop in reputation that results from imposing an unfair 
contract), and -1 to Player 2 (resulting from the acceptance of losing terms).  This 
outcome is not the equilibrium, and those who ignore this will in the long run gain 
poor reputations for not being reasonable to their suppliers.  They will learn 
through lost business as they move to the sub-game equilibrium of no contract 
formation.120  The reputation-leads-to-reasonableness argument is largely only 
applicable to the take-it-or-leave-it scenario.121  The other games do not lend 
themselves to this argument because in those games, as a strategy, sending an 
accommodating form is not rational.   
3. Are Penalty Default Rules at Play Here? 
m in the battle of the forms.  The gap
ty that parties negotiate around in the gap fillers, and thus move away from 
the otherwise efficient Nash equilibrium of the battle of the forms.  In their article 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts,122 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner introduced 
the influential idea of penalty default rules.123  The existence of these rules was 
challenged by Eric Posner’s article There Are No Penalty Default Rules in 
Contract Law.124  This section will explain what penalty default rules are and why 
                                                          
119 For a discussion of the importance of reputation see Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 827. 
120 For commentary on the importance of fairness in capitalism see generally, JOHN MUELLER,
CAPITALISM DEMOCRACY & RALPH’S PRETTY GOOD GROCERY Ch. 2 (Princeton University Press 
1999).  “[A]s [P.T.] Barnum puts it succinctly, ‘[m]en who drive sharp bargains with their customers, 
acti
]efault rules’ are the rules that a program follows in ‘default’ of an 
exp
 been termed background, backstop, enabling, fallback, gap-
filli
osner: A Re-examination of the Theory of “Penalty Default Rules”
ng as if they never expected to see them again, will not be mistaken.’”  Id. at 28. 
121 For a discussion of the effect of reputation and informational asymmetry in consumer contracts 
see Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 827. 
122 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). 
123 Robert Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1703, 1706 n.11 (1989) (“‘[D
licit choice by the user to have some other principle apply.”); see also Ayres, supra note 122, at 91 
n.24; “Default rules have alternatively
ng, off-the-rack, opt-in, opt-out, preformulated, preset, presumptive, standby, standard-form and 
suppletory rules.” Ayres, supra note 122, at 91 (emphasis added).  With respect to Section 2-207(3) the 
application of the rule is slightly buyer-biased, putting a “penalty default” on the seller, ex post, 
encouraging him to negotiate more than he would if the penalty default were different (or differently 
applied), thus the seller is encouraged to take on more cost, ex ante, than he would but for the 
subsection and its application.  
124 Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, U. CHI. LAW & ECON.,
Working Paper No. 237, http://ssrn.com/abstract=690403 (last modified March 19, 2009).  Enrico Baffi 
provided commentary on these two articles in his own article, Ayres and Gertner v. Posner. Enrico 
Baffi, Ayres and Gertner v. P
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A. What is a Penalty Default? 
The Ayres and Gertner article, which introduced the concept of “penalty 
defaul
to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties 
Eric Posner believes they do not exist in contract law.  The next section will show 
that the U.C.C. gap fillers contain a penalty default rule for sellers in Section 2-
715(2).
ts,”125 sought to provide “a theory of how courts and legislatures should set 
default rules.”126  The authors divide the legal rules of contracts and corporations 
into two groups.127  “‘[D]efault’ rules that parties can contract around,” and 
“‘immutable’ rules that parties cannot change.”128  Within the first group of rules, 
“penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in order 
                                                     
(Universitádegli Studi Roma Tre Faculty of Law, Working Paper, Dec. 2006), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=948916.  These articles revisit the classic Hadley v. Baxendale and Lefkowitz v. Great 
Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc. cases.  In this article only Hadley will be briefly discussed, to 
distinguish the Hadley rule from the role of consequential damages in the sale of goods.  See infra note
171 and accompanying text. 
125 Ayres, supra note 122, at 87.  Especially with regard to consequential damages, the gap fillers 
are buyer-favoring/seller-disfavoring.  Keep in mind that the seller in most cases would logically have 
mor
emics have paid little attention about how to choose among possible default rules.”  
Id. a
 fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract 
arou utable rules cannot be contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt to 
con
e information about the product being sold than the buyer since the seller is typically also in 
possession of that which is being sold and so is positioned to know more about the object or service 
offered.  This information about asymmetry may make some wish to favor the buyer when considering 
an ideal default. 
126 Id. at 91 (emphasis added). Presumably the authors wrote the paper specifically because they 
believe that “acad
t 89. 
127 Id. at 87. 
128 Id. “Default rules
nd them.  Imm
tract around them.”  Id.  Ayres and Gertner explain that “immutable rules are justifiable if society 
wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract.  The former 
justification turns on parentalism; the latter on externalities.”  Id. at 88.  Either way, these immutable 
rules are only justified “if unregulated contracting would be socially deleterious because parties internal 
or external to the contract cannot adequately protect themselves.”  Id.  It is not hard to imagine such 
situations.  As to protecting people in the contract, not all people are fit to contract, and keeping them 
from joining an enforceable contract is presumably better for society.  As to protecting those outside of 
a contract, people do not contract in a vacuum; their actions affect others (even if it is only through the 
butterfly effect).  Economists call these effects “externalities,” because they affect parties external to 
the transaction.  By raising the cost of a transaction, a regulator forces transacting parties to internalize 
(i.e. take into account by paying for) some of those externalities (i.e., costs that third parties would 
otherwise bear).  Disagreement over immutable rules usually concerns, “whether in particular contexts 
parentalistic concerns or externalities are sufficiently great to justify the use of immutable rules.”  Id. at 
88-89.  For the purposes of the present paper, immutable rules will be largely set to the side.  
Nevertheless, to the extent that their analysis is profitably demonstrable, consider the following, 
regarding legal responses to contracting around immutable rules: “[f]rom an ex ante perspective the 
possibility of receiving this ex post penalty is just another expected cost of contracting around the 
default rule.”  Id. at 126.  “[C]ourts remove the clauses that transgress the immutable rule and then 
choose a default to fill the gap.”  Id.  “[C]ourts should choose the penalty that provide[s] ‘least cost 
deterrence.’”  Id. at 127.  The authors assert that in the U.C.C., the “warranty of merchantability is 
simply a default rule that parties can waive by agreement.”  Id. at 87.  When language such as “[u]nless 
otherwise unambiguously indicated” is used in the U.C.C., it is clear that a default is being set out.  Id. 
at 88.  See also U.C.C. § 2-314 (providing that “[u]nless excluded or modified [under § 2-316], a 
warranty that goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale” if Seller is a merchant 
of such goods). 
2010 BATTLE OF THE FORMS 29 
islatures must set defaults, “because contracts with 
gaps 
ult.  Because 
tual 
incompleteness” as strategy:
hen parties fail to contract because they want to shift 
hat 
                                                          
(especially the courts).”129   
Reasonable people disagree about the efficacy of specific rules.  
Nevertheless, courts and leg
need to be interpreted.”130  Ayres and Gertner partially attribute 
incompleteness131 in contracts to the fact that, “as transaction costs increase, so 
does the parties’ willingness to accept a default that is not exactly what they would 
have contracted for.”132  Although “[p]rior theorists have argued that parties leave 
gaps in contracts because the cost of writing additional terms outweighs the 
benefit,”133 a second cause of contractual incompleteness occurs: 
[W]hen one party to a contract knows more than another, the knowledgeable party 
may strategically decide not to contract around even an inefficient defa
the process of contracting around a default can reveal information, the 
knowledgeable party may purposefully withhold information to get a larger piece of 
the small contractual pie.134
Therefore, Ayres and Gertner identify another “source of contrac
[P]arties may fail to contract around inefficient defaults for strategic as well as 
transaction cost reasons.  W
the ex ante transaction cost to a subsidized ex post court determination, a penalty 
default of non-enforcement may be appropriate.  When strategic considerations 
cause a more knowledgeable party not to raise issues that could improve 
contractual efficiency, a default that penalizes the more informed party may 
encourage the revelation of information.135
To fill the contractual gaps, “[c]ourts must do something—even if t
pra note 122, at 91. Since the U.C.C. § 2-207(3) gap-fillers are buyer biased, the seller 
take
m to believe that, 
eve
 a gap exists is identical to the issue of what is sufficient to 
con
ave primarily attributed incompleteness to costs of contracting.  Contracts may be 
c p
onally “insensitive” to contingencies (following this through to 
its lo
at 120. 
a note 122, at 120. 
129 Ayres, su
s on an ex post cost that he otherwise would not and so must take on an extra ex ante cost of 
negotiating.  Sellers do tend to negotiate one term, in particular, first, that being consequential damages.  
This negotiation is probably a representation of a penalty default rule in action.  
130 Id. at 89 n.14.  It may not matter which default is chosen: “[e]conomists see
n if lawmakers choose the wrong default, at worst there will be increased transaction costs of a 
second order of magnitude.”  Id. at 89.   
131 Id. at 95 (The “issue of whether
tract around a particular default.”). 
132 Id. at 93.  
  Scholars h
in om lete because the transaction costs of explicitly contracting for a given contingency are greater 
than the benefits.  These transaction costs may include legal fees, negotiation costs, drafting and 
printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability of a contingency, and the costs to the 
parties and the courts of verifying whether a contingency occurred.  Rational parties will weigh these 
costs against the benefits of contractually addressing a particular contingency.  If either the magnitude 
or the probability of a contingency is sufficiently low, a contract may be insensitive to that contingency 
even if transaction costs are quite low.
Id. at 92-93.  Being sufficiently rati
gical end) will lead to parties merely swapping boilerplate forms.  For a discussion of exchanges 
and transaction costs with regard to economic considerations of contract law see HIRSCH supra note 67, 
at 120-24. 
133 Id. 
134 Ayres, supr
135 Id. at 127-28. 
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some faults of non-enforcement can play an 
impor 136
n incentive to place the risks on the least-cost 
t ex ante the parties to the contract had identical 
                                                          
thing is non-enforcement[, because] de
tant role in efficient law.”   Ayres and Gertner consider non-enforcement 
of some contracts (as another default position) as a safeguard against opportunism, 
e.g. where a “non-penalized buyer [could] have incentives to induce sellers to enter 
indefinite contracts in order to extract [a] penalty rent.  By taking each party back 
to her ex ante welfare, the non-enforcement default eliminates this potential for 
opportunism.”137  Therefore, when the default enactment or application rationale is 
to encourage or promote symmetric information, “the penalty default should be 
against the relatively informed party.”138  The policy behind this is that “revealing 
information might simultaneously increase the total size of the pie and decrease the 
share of the pie that the relatively informed party receives.  If the ‘share-of-the-pie 
effect’ dominates the ‘size-of-the-pie effect,’ informed parties might rationally 
choose to withhold relevant information.”139  “The knowledgeable party may not 
wish to reveal her information in negotiations if the information would give a 
bargaining advantage to the other side.”140
To fill the gaps in a contract, some believe courts should look back to what 
the litigants “would have wanted.”141  Ayres and Gertner explain this “is 
analytically analogous to looking forw rda  to what prospective contractors will 
want.  It is to ask . . . ‘who are the prospective parties rooting for?’”142  The 
answer lies in ex ante incentives:  
While ex post each party will have economic incentives to shift costs to the other 
side, ex ante the parties have a
avoider.  If a court can identify tha
interest in allocating a certain risk or duty of performance, then it can, in a sense, 
136 Id. at 89 n.14. 
137 Id. at 98. 
138 Id.  Given that sellers usually have possession of goods before buyers, it would be expected that 
they would be considered the more knowledgeable party, and as such, were Section 2-207 an example 
of a penalty default rule, purposing to create more symmetric information, one would expect its 
ramifications to be buyer biased, which they are.  Id. 
139 Ayres, supra note 116, at 99.  “[E]fficiency corresponds to ‘the size of the pie,’ while equity has 
to do with how it is sliced.”  A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 
(3d. ed. 2003). 
140 Id. at 100. 
141 According to Ayres and Gertner, the literature “has failed to question whether the ‘would have 
wanted’ standard is conceptually sound.”  Id. at 90 (referring to Charles Goetz and Robert Scott; Goetz 
& Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied 
Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985)).  Ayres and Gertner bring others’ points of view into 
consideration, starting with Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, who suggest that “corporate law 
should contain the [defaults] people would have negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arms-length 
for every contingency sufficiently low.”  Ayres, supra note 122, at 90.  Richard Posner “argued that 
default rules should ‘economize on transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that the 
parties would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement.’”  Id.  “Douglas Baird and Thomas 
Jackson have argued that the default rules governing the debtor–creditor relationship ‘should provide all 
the parties with the type of contract that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money 
to bargain over all the aspects of their deal.’”  Id.  “Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have proposed that 
courts should set untailored default rules by asking ‘what arrangements would most bargainers prefer?’” 
Id. at 92. 
142 Ayres, supra note 122, at 89 n.18. 
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have
the process of gap filling to ex post court determination.  If it is costly for the courts 
to determine what the parties would have wanted, it may be efficient to choose a 
is
rent-s ility of strategic 
incom
t
contractual relationships.  In ‘pooling’ equilibria, different types of contracting 
                                                          
pierce the ex post adversarial veil.143
Although would-have-wanted (“majoritarian”) defaults “seem to mini
sts of contracting,”144 Ayres and
wanted’ approach to default selection is . . . incomplete.”145  “[I]f the 
majority is more likely to contract around the minority’s preferred default rule . . . 
then choosing the minority’s may lead to a larger set of efficient contracts.”146  In 
fact:
[T]he very costs of ex ante bargaining may encourage parties to inefficiently shift 
default rule that induces the parties to contract explicitly [, i.e.] penalty defaults are 
appropriate when it is cheaper for the parties to negotiate a term ex ante than for the 
courts to estimate ex post what the parties would have wanted.147
Changing default rules, they explain, may “reduce the opportunities for th
eeking, strategic behavior.  In particular, the possib
pleteness.”  For this reason, “efficiency-minded lawmakers would 
sometimes choose penalty defaults that induce knowledgeable parties to reveal 
information by contracting around the default penalty.”148  After all, “[t]he 
strategic behavior of the parties in forming the contract can justify strategic 
contractual interpretations by courts.”149   
Ayres and Gertner explain that when “choosing among default rules, 
lawmakers should be sensitive to the costs of contracting around, and the costs of 
failing to contract around, particular defaults.”150  Of course, different parties will 
find some terms more problematic than others, so parties’ actions will differ under 
different defaults.  By observing the actions parties take, information can be 
inferred about the parties, and the parties, in giving this information, can be 
described as falling into different degrees of “separating” and “pooling”:  
In ‘separating’ equilibria, the different types of contracting parties, by bearing the 
costs of contracting around unwanted defaults, separate themselves into distinc
parties fail to contract around defaults, thus avoiding transaction costs but bearing 
143 Id. at 89 n.18 (referring to Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of 
Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978)).  
144 Ayres, supra note 122, at 93. 
145 Id.
146 Id.  It might make sense, given the presumptive asymmetric information, to make the seller 
analogous to the majority (and compare the buyer to the minority). 
147 Id.  Nevertheless, “[p]arties who contract around a standard-form clause will face the prospect 
that courts will interpret their contract in a manner that is inconsistent with the parties’ initial intentions.  
Thus, parties who prefer an alternative to the standard-form may accept the latter for fear of 
misinterpretation.”  Id. at 90 n.23. 
148 Id. at 94. 
149 Ayres, supra note 122, at 94. Nevertheless, the courts have not been interpreting contractual 
incompleteness as strategic. See Part VI, Section 1, supra p. 126. 
150 Ayres, supra note 122, at 94. 
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s in contracts for strategic 
reasons
.C.C. § 2-207 is also inconsistent with ‘would have wanted’ default analysis.  
This section supplants the common-law mirror-image rule with the default that 
 lawmakers “should sometimes protect the 
private in
the inefficiencies of the substantive default provisions.151
As such, “[k]nowledgeable parties can leave hole
—they might prefer to remain in an undifferentiated pool than pay their full 
freight in an efficient but unsubsidized equilibrium.”152
Ayres and Gertner use the “Zero-Quantity Default” as an example of the 
concept of penalty default rules:153  “if the partie les ave out the quantity, the 
U.C.C. refuses to enforce the contract.  In essence, the U.C.C. mandates that the 
default quantity should be zero.”154  The policy behind this, according to the 
authors, is that “[i]t is not systematically easier for parties to figure out the quantity 
than the price ex ante, but it is systematically harder for the courts to figure out the 
quantity than the price ex post.”155  To get the parties to agree on that term, a 
quantity they would not like is set as a default, i.e. the zero-quantity defaults are 
considered penalty defaults since neither party would have wanted such a 
contract.156
As to the U.C.C. section this article is most concerned with, the authors 
wrote: 
U
additional terms in an acceptance that do not materially alter the terms of the offer 
become part of a contract between merchants.  This default cannot be reconciled 
with ‘what the parties would have contracted for’ analysis, because there is no 
reason to think that the merchants would have wanted to include the additional 
terms of their contract.  Instead, the rule places an informational burden on the 
party with the last clear chance to come forward and notify the other side if the 
additional terms are objectionable.157
Ayres and Gertner propose that
centives to become informed.  In some instances forcing parties to reveal 
information will undermine their incentives to obtain the information in the first 
place.”158  The authors wrote: 
                                                          
151 Id. at 94-95. 
152 Id. at 118.  For this reason “efficiency-minded lawmakers must therefore be attuned to the 
sour l incompleteness and to the attendant costs of pooling and separating associated 
with
tionale can be found,” but one must be careful with such after the fact 
ratio
n.92 (emphasis added).  Although, on the surface, it may not seem that the “would 
have wanted” analysis applies to Section 2-207, the drafters that draft in full knowledge of the workings 
of t
us use of 
ces of contractua
 their default choice.”  Id.
153 Id. at 96.  Where Ayres and Gertner are working toward an explanation for the zero-quantity 
default and they say that “a ra
nalizations since the Supreme Court has said that they “cannot ‘accept . . . post hoc
rationalizations.”‘  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 397 (1974) (quoting Burlington 
Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962)); see also  SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 
194, 196 (1947). 
154 Ayres, supra note 122, at 95-96. 
155 Id. at 96. 
156 Id. at 97. 
157 Id. at 107 
he section may actually want, ex ante, to reach the gap fillers.  See Keating, supra note 2, at 2712 
(interviews with business lawyers asserting their wish that it be easier to reach the gap fillers). 
158 Ayres, supra note 122, at 107.  “Indeed, one way to identify penalty defaults is to investigate the 
pervasiveness with which parties contract around them, as is done with the seemingly ubiquito
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ss in developing a theory of default choice, then to an 
 to address what the necessary and sufficient 
s Posner Say They Don’t Exist? 
In his p  in Contract Law, Eric 
Posner argues that the examples provided by Ayres, Gertner, and other authors in 
subse
Incomplete Contracts: An 
r the way in which a 
court must approach claims for damages for a breach of contract: 
aud, duress, mistake). 
If there is a gap, apply a default rule. 
If the academy has been remi
even greater degree it has failed
conditions for contracting around defaults should be.  In determining these 
conditions, courts are determining the costs of contracting around a given default.  
The received wisdom that transaction costs are responsible for contractual 
incompleteness implicitly suggests that lawmakers should minimize the costs of 
contracting around defaults so that if any contracting parties do not like the off-the-
rack standard, they can inexpensively tailor their corporate or contractual structure 
to suit themselves.159
B. Why Doe
 pa er, There Are No Penalty Default Rules
quent papers have failed to provide an example of an existing, clear penalty 
default rule, and suggests that penalty default rules simply do not exist or are not a 
distinctive doctrinal category from contract formation rules or interpretive 
presumptions.160  Posner began his article as follows: 
Ayres and Gertner’s influential article, Filling Gaps in 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, introduced  the concept of the “penalty default 
rule,” which is a rule that fills a gap in a contract with a term that would not be 
chosen by a majority of parties similarly situated to the parties to the contract in 
question.161  The purpose of penalty default rules, Ayres and Gertner argued, is to 
force parties to reveal private information, which enables their counterparts to 
perform more efficiently than they would if left uninformed.162
Posner’s paper develops the following framework fo
Determine whether contract formalities are satisfied. 
If so, determine whether there was real consent (not fr
If so, determine what the contract says. 
                                                     
limited warranty disclaimers.”  Id. at 107 n.92. 
159 Id. at 120. 
160 Posner, supra note 124, at 2. 
161 See generally Ayres, supra note 122.  The characterization of the definition of penalty default 
rules is telling.  It emphasizes the difference between a majority would-have-wanted rule and imposed 
gap fillers.  This emphasis takes the focus of the reader away from the “why” and puts it on the “how.”  
A why definition might read: penalty default rules are those which encourage the sharing of information 
by imposing a less favorable term on the relatively informed party when that party does not negotiate 
said term effectively.  This, of course, is only a rough guess at how such a definition could be written, 
and though some issues may exist with it, please allow it to suffice for the current discussion.   
162 Posner, supra note 124 at 1.  As to the first part, it is agreed that this is a viable purpose of the 
penalty default rules; however, as to the second part, it is not certain that this is the only reason for 
encouraging information disclosure.  Consider, for instance, the ability of parties to shift costs from ex 
ante to ex post and to use up valuable court resources.  A not-insignificant reason a penalty default rule 
may be imposed would be to shift information expression to the ex ante position, preventing the 
necessity of courts to discover such latent information ex post.  See Ayres, supra note 122, at 126-27. 
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d, award a remedy.163
four.164  Posner asserts that courts determine 
the ex  believes the pooling 
conce s the pooling concept.  
Posne
icient detail in their contract, so that judicial interpretation in case of a 
cial 
guesswork.  Ayres and Gertner acknowledge that this  This idea was advanced [as 
ague contracts.    
s are 
the cu mple 
econo  externalize their costs on courts.  
One w
                                                          
If an explicit or implied term was violate
Both Posner and I focus on step 
istence of gaps through interpretation.165  He also
pt is an issue with the Ayres and Gertner paper, and it i
r believes it is more plausible that contracting parties will fall along a 
continuum.166
Posner breaks up the ideas expounded in the Ayres-Gertner paper:  
The first idea is that courts use legal doctrines to encourage contracting parties to 
provide suff
dispute will be guided by the ex ante intent of the parties, rather than by judi
acknowledged by A&G] by Lon Fuller,167 who argued that legal formalities serve 
this evidentiary function.168
The second idea is [the judicial externalization problem]169 that penalty default 
rules (in addition to legal formalities) serve the function of encouraging parties to 
produce specific rather than v 170
The first idea is plausible, but the second idea—that penalty default rule
re—is less persuasive.  As to the diagnosis, there is no doubt that in a si
mic model, the parties have an incentive to
ay of doing so may be to leave gaps in their contracts in the expectation that 
courts will fill them properly in case there is a dispute.171
Posner may have a misconception of what the parties are trying to 
accomplish.  It may be in part a shift of costs toward the ex post position.  
Nevertheless, if the parties feel that there is a high likelihood that suits could 
follow a transaction, they are probably more likely to address a broader array of 
terms in their negotiations.  One can imagine a probability tree in which, the riskier 
a transaction is, i.e. the more likely that if it fails it will result in costly litigation, 
the more a party will be willing to mitigate that risk by taking on ex ante costs of 
163 Posner, supra note 124, at 3. 
164 See id.
165 See id. at 6.  However, when applying Section 2-207(3) the courts will actually create gaps in 
contracts through application of the knock-out rule.     
166 See id. at 8.  Although it is true that different parties will attribute different values to different 
situations, it does not hold that these parties will not make decisions similarly, e.g. only negotiate terms 
when the expected benefit outweighs the expected costs of such negotiations. 
167 Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) (“[T]he evidentiary 
function of legal formalities is to provide information to courts in order to lower the costs of subsequent 
decision making”);  see also Ayres, supra note 122, at 124 (In Lon Fuller’s classic, Consideration and 
Form, “the evidentiary function of legal formalities is to provide information to courts in order to lower 
the costs of subsequent decision making.”).  
168 See Posner, supra note 124, at 9. 
169 See id. at 11. 
170 See id. at 9. See also supra Part VI, Section 1 (considering the courts’ acceptance of this 
argument).  
171 This argument differs from mine in that here a gap is created and the expectation is that the 
court will fill them in predictably. 
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[a] contract and are 
destin
negotiation to avoid such nodes.  There would likely be some equilibria that the 
parties find acceptable which could result in litigation; however, if the risk of such 
litigation is sufficiently low, the parties could efficiently overlook fresh negotiation 
of certain terms ex ante (which if they had negotiated, may have lowered the 
court’s ex post costs).  As it is, Posner suggests,172 raising the fees for adjudication 
of contracts cases would lower the incentive to shift costs ex post.  But this 
suggestion overlooks the marginal importance of fees compared to total litigation 
costs, which are often quite high.  Courts would have to require an exorbitant fee 
to have a material effect make a material difference on which terms are being fully 
negotiated ex ante, and the final result would likely be inefficient for society as a 
whole.  “The only difference between [a majoritarian rule and a penalty default 
rule] is that more parties opt out of—or would prefer to opt out of—a penalty 
default rule than out of a majoritarian default rule, everything else held equal.”173
Even if a court misidentifies the justification for applying section 2-207 as being 
the interpretive presumption, e.g., contra proferentem (that a contract should be 
construed against the drafter), this mistake does not mean that it is the true reason 
section 2-207 should be applied.174  Knowing that the consequential damages gap 
filler is a penalty default, the courts can apply it as such, without looking for 
further justification.  Application of the consequential damages gap filler only 
occurs when the gap is created, and so this application is unlike the interpretive 
presumptions that hold regardless of the existence of gaps.175
According to Enrico Baffi, Posner says that penalty default rules (1) are 
different from majoritarian, information-forcing, default rules,176 and (2) are 
“inefficient rules that do not maximize the ex ante value of 
ed to be contracted around in the majority of the cases.”177  Baffi declares:
Lawmakers could significantly reduce the possibility for relatively more informed 
parties to engage in this strategic behavior that results in a gap in the contract: 
indeed, they could choose penalty default rules (like, for example, a rule that 
establishes no compensation for consequential damages) in order to induce the 
informed party to add an efficient overriding clause.178
                                                 
See Posner, supra note 124, at 10. 172
173 Id. at 11.  Following this idea, most sellers would like to opt out of consequential damages, so 
the imposition of the consequential damages gap filler would be an example of a penalty default. 
f information, as inherently acknowledged in the rule of 
inter e
to Keating, many parties do decide to contract around them ex ante, which they 
wou of Section 2-207.  See supra notes 32-33 and 
acco
ase in which Posner disagreed that a lack of consequential damages constituted a 
pen
174 Id. at 17.  The value or power o
ting against the drafter, is an intuipr tive part of contract theory that pulls from our concept of 
fairness.  Informational asymmetry has been developed in game theory and legal contexts in the 
economic literature. 
175 See id. at 18. 
176 Baffi, supra note 124, at 22. 
177 Id.  But even if this were so, U.C.C. gap filler consequential damages may be a penalty default 
rule, n si ce, according 
not do but fold r the expected application 
mpanying text. 
178 Baffi, supra note 124, at 7.  Baffi’s suggestion is interesting because he suggests that a lack of, 
rather than the inclusion of, consequential damages would constitute a penalty default rule.  Id.  He 
chose this example, presumably, because the court utilized similar reasoning for its subsequent use in 
the Hadley case, a c
alty default in practice.  See Posner, supra note 124, at 13-14.  Nevertheless, consequential damages 
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position that any player could take on in that game.  The least similar term, as 
between the negotiations and battle-of-the-forms equilibria, is the consequential-
The assertion that establishing a no-consequential-damages default would 
constitute a penalty default comes from academic discussion of the Hadley case.  
In Hadley the informed party was the buyer of the delivery service.  The court held 
that the courier neither knew, nor had reason to know, that the company needed the 
broken crankshaft fixed immediately or would not be able to operate, and hence 
the courier was not liable for the resulting lost profits.  Taking Ayres’ and 
Gertner’s assertion that informational asymmetry is an important (if not the) reason 
for penalty default rules, and assuming that Posner’s argument that Hadley rule
was not an example of the application of a penalty default rule,179 there is a simple 
observation made by Keating which suggests that consequential damages—in the 
U.C.C.—may constitute a penalty default rule.   
The equilibrium application of consequential damages, as a gap-filler in 
contracts for goods, forces sellers to negotiate that term ex ante, since reaching it 
by default tends to be buyer biased.  When not participating in the battle of the 
forms, sellers are do not negotiate the term.  It is not merely a majoritarian default 
rule because most parties would not include the term in their negotiated, 
functionally complete contracts.   
4. The Continuum of Negotiations Under Equal Bargaining Power: 
Consequential Damages are the Penalty Default Rule in Contract Law 
In the extensive game illustration,180 a curve is drawn connecting the battle 
of the forms equilibrium to the conjoining negotiation game equilibrium.  This 
curve depicts the continuum between the battle of the forms and a fully negotiated 
contract equilibria.  Along the continuum, towards the equilibrium of the battle-of-
the-forms game, consequential damages is written to show that this is the first term 
which is negotiated in moving away from the equilibrium.  The players exchange 
adversarial forms [i.e., they reach (A, A’)], in the battle of the forms as a result of 
strategy.  Nevertheless, as the benefit of a bargain increases and offsets the costs of 
negotiation [i.e., as B(N) becomes equal to C(N)], some terms become worthwhile 
to negotiate, and the players move on the continuum toward the equal bargaining 
power negotiations game and its equilibrium, (N, N’).  In other words, all else 
being equal, when parties have relatively equal bargaining power the predictor of 
whether adversarial boilerplate language will be used, or terms negotiated, turns on 
the relative benefit of the bargain as compared to the costs of negotiation.  Not all 
terms are equally efficient, and the U.C.C. has made this clear, since its gap fillers 
act as the Nash Equilibrium under the battle of the forms; it defines the least-worst 
damages gap filler, and therefore this is the term that tends to be negotiated before 
                                                          
may constitute a penalty default rule in transactions for goods.  See infra Part VI, Section 4 
179 See Ayres, supra note 122, at 91.  Posner asserted that the Hadley rule was actually majoritarian 
because most carriers do not have an advantage over outsiders in the insurance business.  See Posner, 
supra note 124, at 13. 
180 See infra p. 47. 
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an be seen as a penalty for not 
negot
Although legal and economic academicians reveal the conditions for 
maximizing the value of contract they do so in different ways.183
Legal scholars see the law, and its interpretation, as malleable, and therefore tend 
to ma
all others when moving between these equilibria.   
Since most sellers would not typically negotiate the consequential 
damages,181 it can be inferred that most of them prefer not to have that term.  
Therefore, the application of this term by courts c
iating consequential damages.  According to Keating, parties are negotiating 
them ex ante, when exchanging forms, but not when setting out a negotiated, 
functionally complete contract, and it is probably true that they are doing this to 
bypass the inefficient part of the default gap-fillers.  Thus, in action, the gap fillers 
are causing some sellers to change their course of action ex ante.  Courts that apply 
the consequential damages gap filler are applying a penalty default, which 
encourages sellers to negotiate that term ex ante.  Thus, consequential damages are 
a penalty default rule, which the majority of sellers would not want in their 
contracts and which they will contract around ex ante, especially in contracts that 
they would otherwise leave to ex post determinations.  As a penalty default rule, 
the consequential damages gap filler reveals which sellers value a reduction in 
liability enough to negotiate the term rather than “raise the price, buy insurance, 
or—as a last resort—have an extra martini every evening and [] not capitalize the 
corporation too heavily.”182  By revealing this, sellers share information about the 
quality or character of the goods they are selling.  I leave modeling of the signaling 
game between the negotiated fully functional contract, battle of the forms, and the 
battle of the forms plus consequential damages equilibria for future research. 
CONCLUSION
ual exchange, 
ke observations and suggestions about laws themselves.184  Economists, 
however, often take laws as given and seek the optimal behavior under the law.185
Of course the law is malleable, but it is still advantageous for the legal community 
to see that identifying the optimal behavior of parties working under a law is 
important.  If judges ignored the costs and benefits that different strategies 
provided parties under laws, decisions could be biased against reasonable 
strategies that, at first glance, seem unnecessarily mean, selfish, or ambiguous.  
Upon finding the reasons behind strategic behavior,186 the behavior can be 
                                                          
181 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
182 WHITE, supra note 50, at 47-48.   
ery problem tends to become a nail.”  GARETH MORGAN,
CRE . 
 a function can be found.  See, e.g., JAMES STEWART,
CAL
. 
183 Eggleston, supra note 13, at 93. 
184 Id.  “If you only have a hammer, ev
ATIVE ORGANIZATION THEORY 14 (1989)
185 Eggleston, supra note 13, at 93.  In other words, the law is like a mathematical constraint, or 
condition, under which the maximum value of
CULUS 965, 969 (5th ed. 2003).  The economists’ approach may be understood by analogy to 
astronomers, who can only make observations of the cosmos, and then build theories and make 
predictions based on these; rather than creating hypotheses and testing them in labs.  CHARLES I. JONES,
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC GROWTH 2-3 (2d ed. 2002). 
186 Strategic behavior occurs when “a rational person in deciding how to act . . . consider[s] the 
probable reactions of others.”  POSNER, supra note 32, at 19
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observations he 
made
 it 
would
understood and thus judged more accurately and, in turn, more predictably—two 
traits of legal analysis that any legal mind can appreciate.   
Data and theories do not always arise contemporaneously.187  Regarding 
Professor Keating’s article, the information he collected and the 
 preceded and excluded any theory to explain his findings.188  Professor 
Keating wrote that drafters arguably should include proviso-conforming language 
in their boilerplates.  The game theoretic approach of this paper supports that 
position.  Eric Posner asserted that penalty default rules do not exist in contract 
law.  The Keating interviewees’ responses, and the manner in which courts justify 
their application of consequential damages (as an ex post penalty for injecting 
ambiguity, by not negotiating ex ante), suggest, however, that consequential 
damages are the penalty default rule of contracts law.  Drafting boilerplate 
language is a strategic act.  Keating wrote that “those who [drafted one sided 
forms] generally justified it on the grounds that this was probably what the other 
side was going to do, so it was as much a defensive move as anything else.”189   
When parties are in the battle of the forms, there is no belief that a drafter 
could hold about the strategies other parties’ drafters could choose such that
 be optimal to draft without adversarial boilerplate language.190  Therefore 
the use of adversarial language by boilerplate drafters is strategic when the parties 
involved have relatively equal bargaining power.  Judges and others should 
consider this when they are confronted by the battle of the forms.  That parties 
choose to negotiate consequential damages, and not other efficient default terms in 
their boilerplates, before exchanging forms is evidence that this gap filler is a 
penalty default rule, with respect to the sale of goods.  Understanding these things 
should help courts to more adequately explain the policy behind the application of 
the gap fillers under Section 2-207, which in turn should lead to a more predictable 
application of the law, happier businesses, and fewer confounded standard-form 
drafters.  In the near future I hope to undertake empirical research to further 
develop this game-theoretic approach to contract negotiations for the sale of goods 
and develop a signaling game which parties use to move between the battle of the 
forms and negotiated, fully functional contracts.  I think that more of Keating’s 
observations can be tested by surveys and comparing market consolidation 
information to shifts away from the battle of the forms over time.  I also believe 
that a differential study could be performed comparing jurisdictional approaches to 
Section 2-207(2) to see how these differences are affecting the strategies drafters 
are employing across jurisdictions.   
                                                     
187 E.g., Tycho Brahe accumulated data for which Johannes Kepler later supplied theories. 
188 See Keating, supra note 2, at 2714-15 (acknowledging that the data is preceding a theory: 
“[h]aving spent many hours on the phone in interviews that enabled me to see only the tip of a very 
large iceberg, I am left not with radical suggestions for change but instead with a few modest 
observations”).   
189 Keating, supra note 2, at 2701. 
190 GIBBONS, supra note 84, (“Rational players do not play strictly dominated strategies, because 
there is no belief that a player could hold (about the strategies the other players will choose) such that it 
would be optimal to play such a strategy.”)  Id. at 5. 
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PPENDICES
A. U.C.C. § 2-207 
U.C.C. § 2-207.  Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation 
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it 
states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless 
acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different 
terms.
The additional* terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the 
contract.  Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: 
the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
they materially alter it; or 
notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within a 
reasonable time after notice of them is received. 
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is 
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not 
otherwise establish a contract.  In such case the terms of the particular contract 
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any 
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act. 
[* I leave the debate over whether and how Subsection 2 should apply to 
different terms for another day.]  
Comment 1:  
This section is intended to deal with two typical situations.  The one is the 
written confirmation, where an agreement has been reached either orally or by 
informal correspondence between the parties and is followed by one or both of the 
parties sending formal memoranda embodying the terms so far as agreed upon and 
adding terms not discussed.  The other situation is offer and acceptance, in which a 
wire or letter expressed and intended as an acceptance or the closing of an 
agreement adds further minor suggestions or proposals.  . . .  A frequent example 
of the second situation is the exchange of printed purchase order and acceptance 
(sometimes called ‘acknowledgment’) forms.  Because the forms are oriented to 
the thinking of the respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them 
often do not correspond.  Often the seller’s form contains terms different from or 
additional to those set forth in the buyer’s form.  Nevertheless, the parties proceed 
with the transaction. (emphasis added).   
Comment 7:  
In many cases, as where goods are shipped, accepted and paid for before any 
dispute arises, there is no question whether a contract has been made.  In such 
cases, where the writings of the parties do not establish a contract, it is not 
necessary to determine which act or document constituted the offer and which the 
acceptance.  . . .  The only question is what terms are included in the contract, 
and subsection (3) furnishes the governing rule. (emphasis added). 
A
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B. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) 
Sec. 2-715.  Buyer’s Incidental and Consequential Damages 
mages resulting from the seller’s breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of 
which could not 
reaso
conse
ough 
the o  consequential 
dama  to know” in advance is followed, the liberality of 
that r
herwise.   
(2) Consequential da
 the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know and which 
nably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of 
warranty. 
Comment 2.   
Subsection (2) operates to allow the buyer, in an appropriate case, any 
quential damages which are the result of the seller’s breach.  The “tacit 
agreement” test for the recovery of consequential damages is rejected.  Alth
lder rule at common law which made the seller liable for all
ges of which he had “reason
ule is modified by refusing to permit recovery unless the buyer could not 
reasonably have prevented the loss by cover or ot
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C. Extensive Form 
42 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. IV:I 
D. Normal Form 
II. Negotiations  I. Negotiations 
P2 P2
A’ R’ N’ A’ R’ N’ 
P1 A (1, 1) (2, 0) (0, 0) P1 A (1, 1) (2, 0) (0, 0) 
R (1, 1) (0, 2) (0, 0) R (1, 1) (0, 2) (0, 0) 
N (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 2) N (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 2) 
III. Take It or Leave It  IV.  Battle of the Forms 
P2 P2
T L N’ A’ R’ N’ 
P1 A (-1, -1) (0, 0) (0, 0) P1 A (1, 1) (2, 0) (0, 0) 
R (1, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) R (1, 1) (0, 2) (0, 0) 
N (0, 0) (0, 0) (-1, 1) N (0, 0) (0, 0) (-1, -1) 
